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The Constitution allocates sole legislative authority to Congress and ultimate 
interpretive powers to the federal courts.1 How to harmonize these powers has remained 
unclear for almost 220 years.2 If Congress, the legislature, has the sole authority to 
legislate, and if the results of legislating are evidenced in statutes, written texts, approved 
by the legislature, may the courts, in the interpretive process, constitutionally add to or 
subtract from the substantive or remedial effect of the written provisions of those statutes, 
including express statutory definitions?  In the absence of express statutory definitions, 
may the courts depart from the common, ordinary, or usual, including in special fields, 
technical meanings (collectively, as appropriate, “common meanings”), of the words and 
phrases the legislature uses in statutes?3 Would not such additions, subtractions, and 
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1 U.S. Const. art. I, § 1; art. III, §§ 1 and 2.  Both the executive and the various administrative agencies 
must interpret laws in the process of administering them.  They, therefore, of necessity have interpretive 
power.  That power is simply not the ultimate power.  The final say resides with the federal courts. 
2 If one traces the doctrine of legislative supremacy in the Anglo-American tradition back to circa 1215, 
which is not entirely unreasonable, then harmonizing these powers has eluded jurists in the Anglo-
American tradition for nearly 800 years.  To put matters in an even longer-term perspective, the first known 
code of laws, the Sumerian Code of Lipit-Ishtar, was promulgated circa 2500 B.C.  Francis R. Steele, The 
Code of Lipit-Ishtar, 52 Am. J. of Archeology 425 (1948).  The need to distinguish the powers of the 
legislator from those of the interpreter of statutes apparently extends back over 4,500 years.   
3 With respect to any statute, the legislature clearly had the power to add to or subtract from the substantive 
and remedial provisions of the legislation enacted but did not do so.  If the legislature did not exercise that 
power, can the courts constitutionally do so?  The legislature, likewise, clearly had the power to provide 
special definitions for words and phrases used in statutes.  If it did so, may the courts constitutionally 
depart from the legislatively assigned meanings of those words and phrases?  If, on the other hand, the 
legislature selects given words and phrases to express the law and does not give them special meanings, 
i.e., does not provide special definitions, it would appear that the legislature had no intention of conferring 
2departures constitute legislating, a function reserved exclusively to the legislature?  If 
courts, in the interpretive process may constitutionally depart from statutory text, 
including express definitions, and common meanings, what limits their authority to 
depart?  There must be limits or there is no legislative supremacy.  If, in the absence of 
clarifying theory, courts must, purely as a practical matter, on occasion depart from text 
and the common meanings of words and phrases, what prevents courts from abusing the 
interpretive power and becoming the ultimate legislators as well?   
Until jurisprudence answers the foregoing questions, we will continue to have 
incredibly embarrassing lacunae of the most fundamental types in both constitutional law 
and legal theory.  First, and most obviously, after operating under the Constitution for 
almost two hundred and twenty years, we still do not know how to give effect to the 
constitutional provision for legislative supremacy.  Second, since we have no way of 
saying when statutes are interpreted properly, the law is a profession that, given the 
predominate role of statutory law in contemporary society,4 in significant part cannot 
justify the results it produces.   
There have been numerous attempts to answer the questions above.  Although 
intense intellectual effort ordinarily results in substantial progress, that has not been the 
case with respect to statutory interpretation.  Rather than improving, our understanding of 
statutory interpretation has deteriorated over time.  Proposed answers have proliferated, 
especially in recent years,5 and consensus has proved ever more elusive.  There are 
currently at least fourteen theories of statutory interpretation in the United States alone 
 
any meanings but the common meanings.  In light of that presumption, may the courts, in the interpretive 
process, legitimately depart from the common, standard, or usual meanings of those words?   
4 Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 13-14 (1997). 
5 As William N. Eskridge, Jr., notes, since the early 1980s “theories of statutory interpretation have 
blossomed like dandelions in the spring.”  Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 1 (1994). 
3and no telling how many variants of each.6 In spite of the number theories available, or 
maybe because of it, Justice Scalia has candidly admitted: “ . . . American judges have no 
intelligible theory of what we do most,”7 which is to interpret statutes.    One scholar, in a 
highly thoughtful article, has even been led to set forth what he believes to be grounds for 
“reject[ing] the notion that there is a ‘right’ way”8 to interpret statutes and concluded that 
we simply “cannot resolve the debate.”9 This scholar believes that the search for the 
correct interpretive regime must give way to an explanation of “the seemingly endless 
struggles to determine the appropriate judicial approach to legal language.”10 
In reflecting on the chaotic state of the jurisprudence of statutory interpretation, 
the author was reminded of two facts.  First, it is well known in cognitive science that 
solving a problem is often a function of first framing it properly.  As the noted 
epistemologist Alvin Goldman observes:  “The importance of how a problem is 
‘represented’, or ‘framed’, cannot be underestimated.”11 “One conceptualization of a 
problem can make it hard to solve, while another makes it [relatively] easy.”12 In 
 
6 William N. Eskridge, Jr., lists in the neighborhood of thirteen current theories or schools of statutory 
interpretation, i.e., intentionalism, purposivism, textualism, a group under the heading of “jurisprudential 
theories” (including liberal, legal process, coherence, and normativist theories, feminist republicanism, 
deconstruction, social construction, and critical pragmatism), legal realism, and his own theory of dynamic 
statutory interpretation.  See id. If we add in the observations of the critical legal studies movement, the 
number is pushed up to fourteen.   
7 Scalia supra n. 4, at 14. 
8 Timothy P. Terrell, Statutory Epistemology: Mapping the Interpretive Debate, 53 Emory L.J. 523, 558 
(2004) (emphasis in original).  We might even classify Professor Terrell’s views as a fifteenth theory of 
statutory interpretation. 
9 Id. at 525 (emphasis in original). 
10 Id. at 524. 
11Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition 132 (1986).  
12 Id. Goldman illustrates this point with the following example from Michael Posner (“Rephrased from 
Michael Posner, Cognition: An Introduction (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1973), pp. 150-151”): 
Two train stations are 50 miles apart.  At 2:00 P.M. two trains start towards each 
other, one from each station.  Just as the trains pull out of the stations, a bird 
springs into the air in front of the first train and flies ahead to the front of the 
second.  When the bird reaches the second, it turns back and flies toward the first.  
It continues to do this until the trains meet.  If both trains travel at 25 miles per 
4addition, failure to frame a problem properly can be the result of an outright mis-
identification of the problem.  Mis-identification means that proposed solutions will not 
be solutions to the actual problem.  Further, with mis-identification, a solution will not 
merely be difficult, it is likely to be impossible.  Second, it is recognized in science that a 
plethora of competing but inadequate theories almost always signals an underlying failure 
properly to frame a problem or a mis-identification of the problem.13 
Those facts led the author to hypothesize that the current conundrum regarding 
statutory interpretation must be due to a failure adequately to conceptualize and, possibly, 
even a mis-identification of the problems encountered in the interpretation of statutes.  
Since jurists generally focus solely on the problems that statutory rule systems present 
after they are formulated, the author began to suspect that it might prove useful to 
identify the problems we face in formulating statutory rule systems.  The hypothesis that 
 
hour and the bird flies at 100 miles per hour, how many miles with the bird have 
flown before the trains meet? 
Goldman points out:  
If the problem is conceptualized in terms of the bird’s trajectory, one must calculate how 
far the bird goes on each trip between the trains.  The problem is then difficult.  But if it 
is conceptualized in terms of flight time, it becomes trivial.  The trains must travel one 
hour before meeting (50 miles at a closing speed of 50 miles per hour), and at 100 miles 
per hour the bird will fly 100 miles.   
Id. 
13 See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (3rd ed. 1996).  As Stephen Pinker observes: 
“[I]f some phenomenon seems to make no sense no matter how we look at it, we are probably in ignorance 
of deep and far-ranging principles.”  Learnability and Cognition 1 (1991).  By “deep,” Professor Pinker 
means “below the surface,” not necessarily “abstrusely remote.”  As Mark C. Barker notes: “The key to 
resolving a paradox often lies in the imagination.  In a paradox where some experience points to one 
conclusion and other experience seems to point to its opposite, what is needed is not simply more 
experience.  . . .  [W]hat is needed is some new idea that can widen the space of hypotheses.  Then the 
conflicting evidence that seemed to lead to contradictory conclusions can be seen to converge on this new 
possibility.”  The Atoms of Language 5 (2001). It is worth noting how simple many significant 
reconceptualizations have been.   Nicolaus Copernicus’ great insight was simply that things might be the 
other way around, i.e., that the planets revolve around the sun.  Johannes Kepler realized that planets could 
travel in elliptical orbits.  Einstein’s theory of relativity in part grew out of the realization that since light 
travels at a finite speed, the way that different observers in the universe will order events will necessarily 
differ.  And the geometers Lobatchewski, Helmholtz, and others realized that entire new geometries could 
be constructed by assuming that all lines that in Euclidean geometry are parallel meet at infinity or diverge 
at infinity.  J. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station 41-61 
(1991). 
5emerged was that only by first identifying in detail the problems faced in formulating 
statutory rule systems can we truly understand the problems encountered in interpreting 
statutes and, thereby, discover, or at least have a decent chance of discovering, an 
effective solution.   
This article explains in detail the problems we face in formulating statutory rule 
systems.  By way of introduction, the problems are that it is impossible ex ante fully to 
accomplish three essential tasks.  First, it is ex ante often impossible fully to formulate 
and virtually always impossible fully to refine the purposes of a statutory rule system that 
addresses a complex underlying subject matter.  Second, if the underlying subject matter 
is at all complex, it is ex ante impossible to formulate a statutory rule system that is 
substantively and remedially complete in light of its underlying purposes and other 
purposes simultaneously operative in the law.  And third, it is ex ante impossible to 
ensure that the meanings of the words and phrases that comprise a statutory rule system 
are in all respects appropriate in light of those purposes.  The three foregoing problems 
give rise to at least twenty-nine distinct sub-problems.  The collective effect of these 
problems is that we regularly encounter situations that the parties who drafted a statute 
overlooked or failed to anticipate and, therefore, did not address.  When we do, applying 
a statute in accordance with what may be called its “presumptive semantic content”14 will 
all too often produce results that are not only legislatively unintended but random, 
accidental, arbitrary, and also, in varying degrees, irrational, unfair, or unjust.   
 
14 The “presumptive semantic content” of a statute is the information encoded in the text on the basis of  the 
words, phrases, and sentences employed, special definitions provided, and, in the absence of special 
definitions, the common meanings of the words and phrases employed, without regard to the larger context 
out of which the statute emerges.  The presumptive semantic content of a statute may be divided into the 
“presumptive prescriptive content,” the rules, viewed as commands to courts, evidenced in the sentences of 
the text, and the “presumptive lexical content,” the common meanings of words and phrases employed and 
special statutory definitions.  
6Identification of the problems makes it clear that the above hypothesis is, indeed, 
correct.  Jurists, who generally attribute the law related problems faced in the 
interpretation of statutes15 to an ambiguous ambiguity,16 have, in large part, both mis-
identified and failed properly to frame the problems.  The fundamental problems faced in 
connection with statutory interpretation are practical and are only most rarely caused by 
ambiguity.  The solutions, accordingly, are not fundamentally linguistic.  Since, as a 
society, we want our statutory rule systems to be purposively, substantively, and 
remedially complete, that is, effective, and to produce intended, consistent, and non-
arbitrary (that is, rational and, on appropriate occasions, fair and just) results, interpreting 
a statute consists in determining when a statute should be given effect in accordance with 
its presumptive semantic content because the matters at issue were clearly to most likely 
 
15 There are also linguistic problems associated with the interpretation of statutes.  These problems result 
from an additional, equally important, failing in conceptualization.  Jurists, like almost everyone, with the 
exception of cognitive scientists and linguists (the term now used not only for individuals who have 
mastered many languages but generally for scholars and researchers in the field of linguistics), do not have 
adequate conceptualizations of language and linguistic meaning, communication, and comprehension.  That 
problem is only briefly addressed in this article (see infra note 17), but is fully addressed in a companion 
article. 
16 For example, the most exhaustive treatment of statutory interpretation on the American scene is Norman 
J. Singer’s eight volume Statutes and Statutory Construction (2002).  Based on a review of the literature, 
Professor Singer’s treatise mentions ambiguity as the only source of the interpretive problems relating to 
statutes.  As if that were not enough, juristic lore does not clearly distinguish between the types of 
ambiguity.  There are, in fact, at least four primary phenomena that are denoted by “ambiguity.”  The most 
commonly denoted is conceptual, lexical ambiguity.  Occasionally, vagueness is mentioned in connection 
with ambiguity, although seldom is there an attempt to understand vagueness in depth. (An exception is 
Timothy A. O. Endicott, Vagueness in the Law (2000).)  In any event, as Part IV of this article explains, 
there is a second form of non-conceptual, lexical ambiguity that flows from the distinction between 
prototypical and conceptually identical but non-typical uses of words.  See infra, Part IV, at 56.  A third 
type of ambiguity has nothing to do with the meanings of words and noun and verb phrases per se but 
rather with the role that the denotatum or denotata of a word plays or play in a sentence or phrase.  This is 
known as “syntactical ambiguity.”  Syntactical ambiguity occurs, for example in indirect discourse.  In 
indirect discourse it is impossible to tell syntactically what is subject and what is direct object.  Additional 
forms of syntactical ambiguity result from sentence constructions that do not make clear the scope of 
modifiers, i.e., adjectives and adverbs, or the particular referents of pronouns (anaphoric ambiguity).  For a 
sophisticated discussion of syntactical ambiguity see Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Judges 28-92 
(1993).  And finally there is a type of ambiguity that results when one says or writes something that appears 
to conflict with something else one holds to be true or claims to be an objective.  In this instance the 
ambiguity is not linguistic at all.  Rather the ambiguity relates to the beliefs or intentions and purposes of 
the communicator.  The question in this latter case is which belief or intentions and purposes actually hold, 
or can the apparent inconsistencies somehow be harmonized? 
7within the contemplation the parties constructing the rule system and when, in contrast, 
the matters at issue were overlooked or not anticipated and proper application of a statute 
requires the much more complex, extensive, indeed, unending tasks of (1) clarifying and 
refining its underlying purposes, (2) completing inevitably incomplete statutory rule 
systems in light of their underlying purposes and other purposes simultaneously operative 
in the law, and (3) modifying the meanings of words and phrases used in statutory rules 
to bring those meanings into line with the foregoing purposes.17 
17 This may appear to be a quite odd definition of “interpretation,” but it is, in fact, completely in line with 
the understanding of linguistic interpretation that contemporary linguistics has established.  The process of 
linguistic interpretation is far more complicated and sophisticated than for millennia realized. 
 For millennia we have erroneously tended to view language as operating solely as a code.  This 
view was first given philosophical respectability by St. Augustine in 400s.  Anthony Kenney, Wittgenstein
153-54 (1973).  For a discussion of the code theory of language see e.g., C. K. Ogden & A. I. Richards, The 
Meaning of Meaning 10-13 (1923); I John Lyons, Semantics 32-41 (1977).  It is obvious that we do, in fact, 
use nouns and verbs to represent, e.g., things and actions; adjectives and adverbs to represent, e.g., qualities 
of things and actions; prepositions to represent, e.g., relations (e.g., “on” and “over”) and direction (e.g., 
“to” and “away”); phrases to represent, e.g., the things that nouns and verbs represent as modified by the 
qualities that adjectives and adverbs represent; syntax (in English, position in a sentence) to specify, e.g., 
subject and direct object; and grammar to represent, e.g., time (“-ed” indicates the past), gender, and 
number (“-s” represents the plural). Under the code view of language, that is fundamentally all there is to 
language.  All linguistically communicated meaning (information) is encoded in meaning correlates of 
words, phrases, sentences, syntax, and grammar.  By definition, a communicator encodes in language all, 
and only, the information the communicator wants the recipients of his or her communication to 
comprehend.  Accordingly, on this view, all that recipients of linguistic communications can properly 
comprehend is the information they obtain by decoding.  This view of language, which is at the foundation 
of textualism, renders it impossible to understand how the legislature could possibly mean more than or 
something other than the information derivable by decoding statutory text.   
The code view of linguistic communication is now philosophically and scientifically known to be 
false.  That is because it is seriously incomplete.  In using language to communicate, we do much more 
than simply encode and decode.  The linguistic discipline of pragmatics has revealed that, in accordance 
with the demands of epistemology,  linguistic communicators intend and expect the recipients of their 
linguistic communications to comprehend, and the recipients may and should comprehend, all the 
information that is encoded in meaning correlates of words, phrases, sentences, syntax, and grammar plus 
all the additional information that the recipients can properly infer from the combination of the 
linguistically encoded information and all other accessible, relevant information, including in particular, 
all accessible, relevant information regarding  the communicator’s intentions and purposes. See, e.g., the 
works cited infra notes 29 and 30.  That is, linguistic interpretation, or comprehension, includes both the 
obvious encoding and decoding process as well as a sophisticated process of inference drawing that uses as 
premises all relevant information, including information that may first become available to or be 
recognized by either the communicator or recipient well after a linguistic communication is uttered or 
written.  The result is that linguistic communicators always mean more than they say or write, meaning, or 
information, that is derivable by inference.  In that regard, statutes are like all linguistic communications.  
There is absolutely nothing odd or unusual about drawing inferences based all relevant, available 
information and, on that basis, comprehending information with respect to statutes in addition to the 
information encoded in statutory text.  What is somewhat unique about statutes is the sometimes massive 
8Given the constitutional provision for legislative supremacy, the process for 
accomplishing those tasks would ideally always produce objective, politically and 
ideologically neutral, determinate, and undoubtedly legislatively intended results.  The 
conclusion to this article briefly introduces the interpretive process that the insights above 
entail.18 Although that process cannot achieve the ideal, to borrow conceptually from the 
differential calculus, it can approach the ideal qua limit.  If we recognize that results we 
must accept because the probabilities favor them, even if not certain, are determinate, we 
can in the vast majority of real world situations achieve highly determinate, objective, 
politically and ideologically neutral results that can be viewed as certainly to most likely 
intended by the legislature.  And when we encounter situations in which the results are 
unquestionably not determinate, we can, nonetheless, provide justified outcomes, even if 
such outcomes may on occasion have some unavoidable political or ideological coloring.  
Since these situations tend to be at the fringes rather than the core of statutory rule 
systems, that is a quite acceptable, if not perfect, state of affairs.  
Part I.  The Juristic Background.
The juristic lore holds that the source of the problems we encounter in interpreting 
statutes lies in an ambiguous ambiguity.  Ambiguity is supposedly not only the cause but 
the cause of our interpretive problems.  Since ambiguity is typically associated with 
words and phrases, some jump to the conclusion that the primary problem in the 
interpretation of statutes is purely lexical, relating to the meanings of words and phrases.  
 
amount information that we must draw on relative to that encoded in the communicative text.  Indeed, in 
interpreting statutes it is common that we must actively seek out and use in inferences a large volume of 
information that appears nowhere in text.  Further, we must often infer immense amounts of information 
relative to that which is textually encoded.  Properly viewed, legal reasoning is the process of performing 
consciously and explicitly the mental operations, in large part inferences, that, in typical communicative 
settings, we perform unconsciously and automatically.    
18 A full explanation of that interpretive process is reserved for a companion article. 
9That leads to the search for purely lexical solutions.  However, scholars such as H. L. A. 
Hart, William Eskridge, Jr., and Richard Posner19 point out that sometimes the problem 
in understanding what a statute provides traces to the fact that the matter at issue was not 
contemplated when the statute to be interpreted was formulated.  That is clearly not a 
problem attributable to lexical ambiguity.  While both Professor Eskridge and Judge 
Posner have proposed an especially insightful “faithful agent” approach to these 
problems, neither has worked out in detail the full implications of his insights.  As will 
become clear, that, in fact, is a significant part of what needs to be done.    
Part II of this article explains in general terms the origin and nature of problems 
encountered in formulating statutory rule systems.  Part III expands on the insights of the 
scholars identified in the preceding paragraph and demonstrates that many of the 
problems we encounter with respect to statutes are not at all lexical in nature.  When that 
is so, the search for lexical solutions is completely beside the point.  Part IV of this article 
demonstrates that there are, indeed, lexical problems associated with statutes, of which 
lexical ambiguity is the least.  But, Part IV also demonstrates that if the lexical problems 
are not clearly understood, it is not possible to respond to them intelligently.  For 
example, when faced with what they take to be a lexical problem, some justices and 
judges resort to dictionaries in, what will become clear, is generally a vain attempt to find 
the correct statutory meanings.20 The first mistake these justices and judges, and many 
 
19 H. L. A Hart, The Concept of Law 124-36 (2nd ed. 1994); Richard N. Posner, The Problems of 
Jurisprudence 269-73 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Fetch Some Soup Meat, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 2209 
(1995).    
20 There are several articles that discuss dictionaries as aids in statutory interpretation.  See, e.g., Samuel A. 
Thumma & Jeffery L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme 
Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 227 (1999) (an exhaustive article but for its failure to 
question the reliability and accuracy of dictionaries generally); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain 
Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 71 (1994); Note, Looking It 
Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1437 (1994).   
10
legal scholars for that matter, make is blithely to assume that dictionaries are sound 
sources for word meanings, although the fact dictionaries often differ should have given 
them pause.  In contrast, linguistic scholars who specialize in lexical semantics appear to 
be unanimously agreed that dictionaries are not reliable sources for word meanings.21 
Anyone who takes the time to work out the meaning of a word along the principles 
outlined by Paul Ziff,22 Anna Wierzbicka,23 and other experts in lexical semantics can 
confirm that fact for themselves.24 So we are treated to the truly absurd spectacle of 
 
21 “A definition expresses a hypothesis about the meaning of a particular word, and it is valid if it accounts 
correctly for the range of use of this particular word.” Anna Wierzbicka, Semantics: Primes and Universals
183 (1996).  Unfortunately, “faith in dictionary definitions is based on an illusion.”  “[D]ictionary 
definitions don’t offer anything like a faithful representation of a word’s meaning . . ..”  “Often, they don’t 
even try to provide a definition, but instead offer more or less random lists of quasi-synonyms . . ..” Id. at 
250, 240 (emphasis added).  The problem, among others, is that the cost of producing truly reliable 
definitions would render any dictionary containing reliable definitions commercially unmarketable.  Id. at 
250.  Equally important, it is not bloodless dictionary meanings that we need to know but the meaning of 
“words in the mind.”  It is “words in the mind,” not words in dictionaries, that parties drafting statutes 
employ.  However, “the mental lexicon is . . . a mammouth structure.  The relationship between a book 
dictionary and the human mental lexicon may be somewhat like the link between a tourist pamphlet 
advertising a seaside resort and the resort itself.”  “[A] book dictionary gives us a spuriously neat, static 
and incomplete view of the mental lexicon.  The differences between words in the mind and words in books 
are . . . profound.”  Jean Aitchison, Words in the Mind: an Introduction to the Mental Lexicon 14 (1994) 
(emphasis added).   “[B]ook dictionaries . . . serve a useful, though limited purpose, enabling us to check on 
the conventional spelling of a word and to find out its approximate meaning.  Indeed, if we did expect a 
book dictionary to include the same information as the mental lexicon, then we would undoubtedly require 
a fleet of lories [trucks] to carry its microstored edition around in.”  Id. “[O]rdinary dictionaries are limited 
in scope in comparison with the mental lexicon.  Their organization is oversimple, their content is fixed and 
outdated, and they contain only a relatively small amount of information about each item.”  Id at 15. 
22 Paul Ziff, Semantic Analysis (1960). 
23 Anna Wierzbicka, Semantics: Primes and Universals (1996); Lexicography and Conceptual Analysis
(1985). 
24 “[T]here are few things harder than constructing a good definition.”  Anna Wierzbicka, Semantics: 
Primes and Universals 267 (1996). 
[C]onstructing a definition which matches a word’s entire range of use is a huge task 
requiring much more work than most are prepared to put in; and the temptation to give up 
after the first two minutes or the first two hours may well be overwhelming.   
Id. at 241.  A good example of the process required to establish a sound definition is provided by Paul Ziff 
in his attempt to define “good” in English.  In doing so Ziff examined one hundred and sixty distinct uses 
of the word to insure that his definition adequately accounted for each.  See Ziff, supra note 22.  For 
examples of definitions worked out systematically by a leading lexical semanticist, see Anna Wierzbicka, 
Lexicography and Conceptual Analysis (1985).  
11
august justices and judges arguing over which unreliable dictionary and which unreliable 
dictionary definition should be deemed authoritative.25 
But there is a second and even greater mistake that these justices, judges, and 
legal scholars make.  As Part IV makes clear, often the problem with words and phrases 
used in statutes is that the human lexicon does not at the time a statute is being 
formulated contain any word or phrase with a pre-existing meaning that is fully 
appropriate to the purposes of the statute at issue.  When faced with that situation, the 
task of the court is not to pick any pre-existing meaning out of any dictionary, or even out 
of the aggregate existing mental lexicons of all English and non-English speakers, but 
rather for the first time in human history to construct a meaning that is sensible in light of 
the purposes of the statute at issue and other purposes simultaneously operating in the 
law.  When that is in fact the task before the courts, resort to dictionaries for ultimate 
answers is doubly absurd.  Without knowing it, justices and judges are looking in 
dictionaries for the supposedly correct non-existent meaning.  
On still other occasions judges attempt to resolve lexical problems by resort to 
supposedly grammatical or syntactical canons of construction.26 Legal scholars have 
rightly in significant part discredited this procedure.27 In addition, resort to the 
supposedly grammatical or syntactical canons can also often be rejected on the grounds 
 
25 Since lawyers and judges are unquestionably far more sophisticated about linguistic meaning that the 
typical layman, there is a tendency to believe we know more than we, in fact, do.  It turns out that linguistic 
meaning is an extremely complex phenomenon.  The author, through research in linguistics and reflection 
on that research, has identified over twenty distinct linguistic phenomena that pass under the name 
“meaning.”  Jurists are neophytes compared with linguists, and it is time jurisprudence caught up with and 
incorporated the insights that linguistics has produced in over a century of scientific inquiry.  
26 Justice Scalia is one who sings the praises of the grammatical, or textual, canons.  See Scalia, supra note 
4, at 25-27 (1997).   Wilson Huhn asserts that: “Textual canons . . . operate like rules of syntax in that they 
are used to infer the meaning of a rule from its textual structure.”  The Five Types of Legal Argument 23 
(2002). 
27 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Modern Statutes, Loose Canons, and the Limits of Practical Reason: A 
Response to Farber and Ross, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 579 (1992); Kent Greenwalt, Statutory Interpretation: 20 
Questions 211 (1999). 
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that contemporary linguistics and cognitive science have made it clear that in many 
instances the linguistic assumptions underlying those canons are positively false or hold 
only in special circumstances that cannot blindly be presumed to prevail in every legal 
setting.28 For example, the canon that clear and unambiguous language requires no 
interpretation is scientifically wrong.  Contemporary linguistics has established that, with 
the possible exception of some purely formal mathematical or logical statements,29 all 
communicative language requires interpretation, often at several levels.30 
28 Neither have jurists provided unquestioned grounding for the substantive canons.  As the article that is a 
companion this article makes clear, with a little support from contemporary linguistics some of the 
substantive canons that are much maligned by textualists can be solidly grounded linguistically, 
epistemologically, and jurisprudentially (including constitutionally). 
29 Such statements are sometimes referred to a “eternal sentences.”  See Robyn Carston, Thoughts and 
Utterances 29-32, 38-39, 65, 74-83 (2002).  Jon Barwise and John Perry refer to such sentences as 
“nonefficient” in that they can convey only a single, timeless meaning: 
One can imagine nonefficient sentences, sentences that make the same claim about the 
world no matter who says them and when.  These are (roughly) what Quine calls eternal 
sentences. They contain no words like I, no demonstratives like THIS, no tense.  One can 
imagine such sentences, but with the possible exception of sentences from mathematics it 
is not easy to produce examples.   . . .  [T]he efficient unit of meaning (whether 
expressions or something else) is the norm.   
Situations and Attitudes 6 (1983).  Some argue that all sentences are efficient, i.e., require interpretation.  
See Carston, supra, at 30-42.   
30 See, e.g, Dan Sperber & Deidre Wilson, Relevance: Communication & Cognition (2nd ed. 1995); Stephen 
C. Levinson, Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature (2000); 
Carston, supra note 29; A. J. Sanford & S.  C. Garrod, Understanding Written Language: Explorations of 
Comprehension Beyond the Sentence (1981); Phillip N. Johnson-Laird, The Mental Representation of the 
Meaning of Words, 25 Cognition 189 (1987).  Even a sentence as simple as “the cat is on the mat” requires 
significant interpretation.  If the sentence is uttered as an actual communication, it will mean, depending on 
exactly who says it, when, and where, something like: “The cat(that this speaker is referring to) is(at 10:46a.m., on 
November 18, 2005, Central Time, U.S.A.) [elided—in (the speaker’s dining room)] on the mat(that the speaker is referring to 
and that is on the speaker’s dining room table).” A great deal of information, such as the specific cat, the actual 
time, and the actual place of reference (all the matter subscripted), that is “not said” would be understood 
not through decoding but through inferences from the totality of all available information.  
Concerning the claim that words that are clear and unambiguous require no interpretation, there is 
the story related by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson.  In 1930 two friends were discussing the Soviet 
Union.  One, an optimist believed that Lenin and his successor, Stalin, had created the workers’ paradise. 
The other, a pessimist, claimed it was all a fraud.  The optimist realized that the only way to settle the 
dispute was to visit the Soviet Union.  He said:  “I will go to the Soviet Union, see how things are, and 
write you and tell you. Now, although I am an optimist, I realize things are not always as they seem.  If the 
Soviet Union is a police state and I cannot report truthfully, I will write what they want me to write, but I 
will write in purple ink.”  The optimist left for his visit, and in due course a letter arrived.  The letter was 
written in black ink.  In it the optimist said that the Soviet Union was, indeed, the workers’ paradise.  All 
workers lived in castles and dined on caviar.  His final sentences read: “Consumer goods are so plentiful 
and inexpensive you would not believe it.  You can buy everything you want with only one exception.  You 
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In addition to the above, most justices and judges regularly resort to a somewhat 
vague legislative intent to find the meaning of words and phrases that legislators may 
have had in mind at the time of drafting.31 They also regularly resort to statutory 
purposes as an aid in understanding both the meanings of words and phrases and entire 
statutory provisions.32 Both these procedures are cognitively, linguistically, 
epistemologically, and jurisprudentially, including constitutionally, proper and sound—as 
far as they can take us.  The problem is that the traditional resorts to legislative intent and 
statutory purposes have their limitations.33 Again, drawing on the insights of scholars 
such as Hart, Eskridge, and Posner, if the matter at issue was not even remotely 
contemplated by the parties formulating the statute, there will certainly be no express 
legislative intentions regarding it in any of the traditional sources.  Likewise, the statutory 
purposes ascertainable by traditional means, such as text and legislative history, will also 
fail to shed light on the matter.  Traditional jurisprudence has no way of ascertaining the 
intentions of legislators in such circumstances and, inevitably, comes up short.34 
There is, in addition an array of interpretive alternatives, none of which fully 
addresses the problems encountered in statutory interpretation, has achieved general 
 
cannot buy purple ink.”  In this context the words “you,” “cannot,” “buy,” “purple,” and “ink” are not in 
the least bit ambiguous.  Nonetheless, in the context above “you cannot buy purple ink” means: “The 
Soviet proclamations of the workers’ paradise are lies.”  Adapted from Sperber & Wilson, supra at 170.  
31 The author has not yet found an adequate explanation of the concept of legislative intent.  Sometimes the 
term appears to be limited to the intention to supply a specific meaning for a word or phrase.  On other 
occasions it seems to include the intention to pursue specific purposes.  In the instant discussion, nothing 
turns on sorting matters out.    
32 This is a time honored approach evidenced in Edmund Plowden’s theory as set forth in his 1574 report of 
Eyston v. Studd, 2 Plow. 459, 467, 75 Eng. Rep 688 (1574) and the commentary in the report of the 
Exchequer Chamber’s opinion in Heydon’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (1584). 
33 See William N.Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 13-47 (1994). 
34 There are, indeed, intentions, a relatively complex set of intentions, that we can, indeed, must, attribute to 
the legislature in these situations.  That set is introduced briefly in the Conclusion to this article and 
examined in detail in the companion to this article.  That article is entitled:  Statutory Interpretation: The 
Gordian Knot Untied. This article is intended to loosen some of the stands of that knot. 
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acceptance, or clearly accords with the constitutional provision for legislative 
supremacy.35 
Without understanding exactly what is it they are confronting, and reflecting on 
the chaotic state of jurisprudential interpretive theory, some scholars conclude that 
nothing constrains interpretive outcomes when statutes are at issue.36 And, as noted 
above, at least one obviously very intelligent and deep thinking scholar has concluded 
that there is no right way to interpret statutes.  Nonetheless, most jurists, especially 
practicing lawyers, adopt a sort of “Humean” attitude37 and manage to work within the 
system, finding that despite the chaos in interpretive theory there is sufficient 
predictability in the way judges in fact decide cases that competent lawyers can give 
generally reliable advice.  Judicial behavior is sufficiently consistent that outcomes are 
not all random—and neither are they all determined by the political proclivities of judges.  
Wilson Huhn has ably explained why that is so.38 Specifically, he has shown that there 
are identifiable types of arguments that courts consider in interpreting statutes, and 
sometimes all or most of the arguments lead to the same result.  Accordingly, even if 
traditional legal reasoning does not compel specific outcomes, it, nonetheless, very often 
 
35 For a masterful and balanced critique of interpretive theories see Eskridge, supra note 33.  Professor 
Eskridge clearly proves that statutory interpretation is dynamic, but he does not explain in full why it must 
be dynamic and how to circumscribe the dynamicism in a way that fully accords with the constitutional 
principle of legislative supremacy.  
36 See, e.g., Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L. J. 1 
(1984); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1151, 1152 (1985); David Kairys, 
Law and Politics, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 243, 244 (1984). 
37 David Hume, one of the giants in modern philosophy, argued quite persuasively that, inter alia, one 
cannot empirically prove that physical objects persist when unobserved or discover any necessary 
connection between causes and effects.  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature Part IV (2nd ed., L. A. 
Selby-Bigge ed., 1978) (originally published 1739-40).  That seemed to him to leave open the possibility 
that the world could literally dissolve into chaos.  He admitted, however, that as soon as he left 
philosophizing behind an entered the company of good friends he promptly forgot all about the problem.  “I 
dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse with my friends; and when after three or four hour’s 
amusement, I wou’d return to these speculations, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any 
further.”  Id. at 269. 
38 Huhn, supra note 26, at 83-89.    
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has the practical effect of producing quite predictable and specific outcomes.  
Nevertheless, individual litigants are at mercy of a multitude of interpretive theories.  The 
very multiplicity of theories is itself one of the primary causes of indeterminacy in the 
law.  Since different judges adhere to different theories, the random assignment of judges, 
even when panels of judges are convened, on many occasions unquestionably gives rise 
to randomly different outcomes.  There is, thus, a regrettable, residual randomness in 
justice delivered.  Justice is also more expensive than it would be if we had a uniform 
theory of interpretation that increased the percentage of predictable results.  As things 
stand, many litigants have incentive to play the costly interpretive theory lottery.    
Part II.  The Real Problems in Statutory Interpretation—an Overview.
Despite the juristic lore, ambiguity, in any of its aspects, is only most rarely the 
cause of the problems we face in interpreting statutes.  It is the practical that problems we 
encounter in formulating statutory rule systems that virtually always cause our 
problems.39 There are, as noted above, three primary practical problems that together 
give rise to at least twenty-nine distinct sub-problems.  Conceptual, lexical ambiguity is 
 
39 This became clear to the author as a result of his practice experiences.  The author entered the practice of 
law in 1975, just as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”)was taking effect.  The 
provisions of what was originally ERISA are currently largely found at 29 U.S.C. §§1104-1144 and 1301-
1461 and 26 U.S.C. 401-415 and 4974-4975 (2000).  The author spent over twenty years in practice 
watching ERISA’s rule system grow through regulations, administrative agency rulings and opinion and 
advisory letters, and case law, as is indicated infra in Part III, pp. 30-36, below.  In 1993 the author 
assumed responsibility for advising a major corporation of its responsibilities under the then recently 
enacted Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2654 (West 1999).  The same 
phenomenon repeated itself over the next ten years, albeit on a significantly smaller scale.  It then became 
clear to the author that all statues undergo the same evolution, an evolution that is not all that different from 
the evolution of the common law.  The only substantial difference is that the legislature attempts from the 
beginning to paint more broadly than do the courts.  But, in spite of the running start, statutes almost 
immediately raise problems identical to those encountered in the common law. 
 Lawyers, in fact, run into the identical problems in the drafting of contracts in connection with 
complex transactions and in drafting pension plans and stock option plans.  Addressing in advance all the 
problems that might surface is simply impossible. 
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only one of those problems.40 The problems that we indiscriminately call “ambiguity” 
are virtually always secondary problems that flow from the primary, practical problems.  
Statutory interpretation is, in significant part, addressing these practical problems.   
To expand on what was said above, the first practical problem is that the subject 
matters underlying statutes are too complex, our initial understanding of those subject 
matters often too limited, and the competing purposes of the law almost always too 
complex to permit the ex ante formulation of fully refined statutory purposes.  Rather, all 
statutory rule systems inevitably emerge with underlying purposes that are in various 
degrees unrefined.  Occasionally, the underlying purposes are in significant respects 
inchoate.  The second practical problem is that the incomplete initial understanding of the 
underlying subject matters, the less than fully refined purposes, the potentially infinite 
detail that needs to be addressed by all statutes that address complex subject matters, and 
the interplay of every statute’s purposes with other purposes the law is simultaneously 
pursuing (but that are largely beyond the horizon of awareness of the parties formulating 
any given statute as they focus on the problems at hand) render it impossible ex ante to 
formulate anything even approaching a complete statutory rule scheme.  Even if statutory 
purposes are relatively completely refined, the remaining obstacles mean that the 
statutory rule systems that are designed to achieve them inevitably emerge incomplete in 
greater and lesser degree.  In fact, any relatively complex statutory rule system will, in 
some respects, forever remain incomplete.   
 
40 There is a thirtieth problem we encounter in the interpretation of statutes.  That is syntactical ambiguity.  
For an excellent discussion of syntactical ambiguity see Solan, supra note 16.  This article does not discuss 
syntactical ambiguity because such ambiguity can always be eliminated by careful drafting. The problems 
with which this article is concerned are those that inherent to formulation of statutes and that remain after 
even great care is taken in drafting. 
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The third practical problem is that the issues we attempt to address through 
statutes are so varied and complex that it is ex ante impossible to ascertain the meanings 
for words and phrases that would be perfectly appropriate to the purposes of statutory 
rule systems and other purposes that the law is simultaneously pursuing.  Accordingly, 
statutes inevitably emerge containing words and phrases with common meanings or even 
specially drafted definitions that are not in all ways appropriate to the purposes 
underlying that statute and other purposes the law is simultaneously pursuing.   
The unfortunate fact is that only an omniscient and fully prescient mind could ex 
ante fully understand the kinds of complex subject matters that tend to underlie statutes, 
fully refine a statute’s purposes in light of a complex underlying subject matter, take into 
account all the competing purposes of the law, and formulate a complete statutory rule 
system incorporating definitions for words and phrases that are fully appropriate to all 
those purposes.  And if the mind of such a being worked at the speed of a typical human 
mind, it would still be a lengthy process—one that on some occasions might not be 
possible to complete in a politically acceptable amount of time.  The consequence is that 
when we encounter situations that the parties drafting a statute overlooked or failed to 
anticipate and in these situations apply statutory rule systems literally, that is, give effect 
to their presumptive semantic content, the results are not only often unintended, 
accidental, random, and, accordingly, arbitrary, but also, often, in varying degrees, 
irrational, unfair, or unjust.41 The latter outcomes conflict with either or both the 
purposes underlying the statute or other purposes simultaneously operating in the law.  
We label such conflicts “ambiguity” without specifying the type of ambiguity at issue.  In 
fact the ambiguity is fundamentally an ambiguity of purpose, the primary type of 
 
41 That does not mean that they are always unacceptable, only that they are highly likely to be.   
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ambiguity we encounter with respect to statutes.  These conflicts arise, or slip through, 
because the parties formulating a statute are not aware they potentially exist and, 
therefore, both cannot not and do not address them.   
Part III of this article identifies four types of ways in which the purposes 
underlying statutory rule systems can emerge unrefined and twelve types of ways in 
which statutory rule systems inevitably emerge incomplete.42 Each of these types can 
occur many times with respect to a single statute.  To put the matter in terms familiar in 
linguistics, there are in total at least sixteen types of ways that statutory purposes and rule 
systems emerge unrefined and incomplete, and each of those types may surface in 
numerous tokens.  The result is that the number of actual instances of incompleteness can 
run into the hundreds and thousands.43 
Part IV identifies thirteen ways in which statutory rule systems inevitably begin 
life with key words and phrases that are partially inappropriate to the purposes underlying 
the statutes and other purposes simultaneously operative in the law.  As is the case with 
statutory purposes and rule systems, in the absence of an omniscient and fully prescient 
mind, the partial impropriety of the meanings of words and phrases is not practically 
recognizable, or at least not fully recognizable, ex ante and cannot be rectified before a 
statute is enacted.    Again, each type of partial impropriety may surface numerous times, 
 
42 The author makes no claim that any of the lists set forth in this article is exhaustive. 
43 If this assertion, or at least the “thousands” part, strikes the reader as exaggerated, the author suggests 
that the reader turn to the discussion of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (the 
provisions of what was originally ERISA are currently largely found at 29 U.S.C. §§1104—1144 and 
1301—1461 and 26 U.S.C. 401—415 and 4974—4975 (2000)) infra text at pp. 30-36, and after reading 
that discussion, count the United States Code Annotated  annotations following each of the provisions of 
the act.   
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giving rise to tokens that in number are many multiples of twelve, occasionally hundreds 
or thousands of tokens.44 
The foregoing practical problems give rise to two linguistic problems, only one of 
which is lexical.  Given the complexity of the subject matters and purposes underlying a 
statutory rule scheme and other purposes simultaneously operative in the law (which, to 
repeat, are in large part beyond the horizon of awareness of the parties formulating the 
statutory rule system at issue), parties formulating statutory rule systems cannot uncover 
and anticipate all necessary and/or appropriate rules (including exceptions to rules and 
resolutions of conflicts between rules and purposes) and will inevitably fail to include 
some, often many.  They will also incorporate words and phrases with common meanings 
and even express statutory definitions that are not fully appropriate to the purposes 
underlying the rule scheme and other purposes simultaneously operative in the law.  Even 
if they become aware of the need to formulate special statutory definitions, seldom will 
those definitions be adequate in all respects. The linguistic consequences, rather 
obviously, are that the texts of statutes do not contain all the sentences they would if they 
were complete—sentences that would set forth additional substantive and remedial rules.  
And, to reiterate, the sentences that do appear in the text will contain words and phrases 
with apparent meanings, i.e, their common meanings or specially drafted definitions, that 
are not fully appropriate to the statutes in which these words and phrases appear.   
 
44 The terms “management” and “administrative” under the Fair Labor Standards Act regulations (29 
C.F.R. §§ 541.1, 541.2, 541.102—541.115, 541.200—541.210 (2005)) were so vague that the courts 
treated their application as one for the fact finder.  In literally thousands of instances one could not tell 
whether specific jobs fell within or without the categories.  Had the courts bitten the bullet and undertaken 
to eliminate the vagueness, the resulting definitions would have been exceedingly complex, indeed. 
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Part III.  The Inherent Incompleteness of Statutory Rule Schemes.
Cognitive science, with assistance from the philosophy of mind and general 
principles of epistemology, has over the last twenty or so years made clear the central 
role that our knowledge of intentions and purposes plays in the comprehension of all 
human behavior, including linguistic behavior.45 Building on these insights, the linguistic 
discipline of pragmatics46 has focused intensively on the central role that inferential 
processes that make use of communicators’ intentions and purposes play in language, the 
creation linguistic meaning(s), and the formulation and comprehension of linguistic 
communications.47 Pragmatics has made it clear that, with the possible exception of 
certain statements in pure logic or mathematics, understanding any linguistic 
communication requires taking the communicator’s intentions and purposes into 
account.48 As noted above, contrary to the judicially declared canon that proclaims that 
unambiguous language precludes the need for interpretation, scientific linguistics has 
made it clear that plain and unambiguous language never precludes the need for 
interpretation.  Words, phrases, and sentences spoken or written are always only 
evidence, along with other evidence, especially of communicators’ intentions and 
 
45 See, e.g., Sperber & Wilson, supra note 30; Robyn Carston, supra note 29; Simon Baron-Cohen, 
Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind (1995); Robert Audi, Action, Intention, and 
Reason (1993); Daniel Dennet, The Intentional Stance (1989); Charles Taylor, The Explanation of 
Behavior (1964).  See also Noam Chomsky’s devastating 1957 attack on behaviorism.  Review of Skinner, 
35 Language 26 (1957).  For an introduction to the interrelations between linguistics, philosophy, and 
cognitive science see, e.g., Howard Gardner, The Mind’s New Science: A History of the Cognitive 
Revolution (1985) (a cognitive scientist’s perspective); Owen Flanagan, The Science of the Mind (1984) (a 
philosopher’s perspective).     
46 The contemporary linguistic discipline of pragmatics, not to be confused with the philosophical school of 
pragmatism, derives originally from the writings of the linguistic philosopher H. Paul Grice. 
47 See supra note 30. 
48 See supra note 30.  
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purposes, of what a speaker or writer means, in the sense of “intends the recipient of his 
or her linguistic communication to comprehend.”49 
The fact is that the human cognitive system is as much wed to intentions and 
purposes in the explanation and comprehension of human behavior, including linguistic 
behavior, as it is to mathematics in the explanation and comprehension of physical 
phenomena.  Intentions and purposes are cognitive, explanatory vehicles that operate in 
our understanding and explanation of human behavior in a way that that is analogous to 
the way forces operate in our understanding of physical phenomena.50 It has become 
clear that, whether or not intentions, purposes, causes, numbers, and mathematical 
relations exist as phenomena distinct and apart from the human cognitive faculty, they are 
the tools with which we must operate in their distinctive spheres.  It would make as much 
sense to demand that we understand human behavior, including linguistic behavior 
(which includes statutes), without the explanatory vehicles of intentions and purposes as 
it would to demand that we understand the world of physics without resort to 
mathematics and mathematical relations.51 
49 This is, indeed, the central of the many meanings of “meaning.” 
50 For an explanation of intentions (which have related purposes) as causes see, e.g,, John Searle, 
Intentionality 112-40 (1983).  Steven Pinker explains the role of intentions and purposes in terms of 
“feedback loops.”  The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature 32 (2002).  See also Audi, supra 
note 45, at 110-144, for a discussion of the nomological, even if not causal, nature of intentions. 
51 Some argue that we cannot sensibly ascribe intentions and purposes to the legislature.  There are so many 
minds.  How can they all have the identical intentions or be set on the identical purposes?  One answer is 
that collective action in large groups is never the result of absolutely identical states of mind of all group 
members.  Of necessity, some small group out of the whole, often a single individual, has to be designated 
to provide the intentions and purposes whereby the group acts.  So the legislative intentions and purposes 
with which we are concerned of necessity must, in part, be those of the key actors in crafting and moving 
legislation forward.  The key actors propose and the remainder disposes, whether the remainder 
understands, or even cares about, what has been proposed.  Their knowledge and concern is not 
constitutionally required.  But there is an even more fundamental reason we must ascribe intentions to the 
legislature.  As noted above in the text, intentions and any accompanying purposes are the only vehicles the 
human cognitive system provides us for understanding and explaining human behavior.  We must use, and 
cannot operate without, that which nature has given us, even if what nature has given us is not, in the 
setting of the law, in every respect ideal.  Whether it is conceptually neat to do so, we have no choice but to 
analyze legislative actions in terms of intentions and purposes.  We find ourselves in the same bind with 
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All that said, to repeat what was noted above, one of the three primary practical, 
and therefore communicative, problems relating to statutes flows from the fact that it is 
ex ante virtually impossible fully to formulate the purposes of a statutory rule scheme 
with an even modestly complex underlying subject matter.  No wonder we are sometimes 
stymied in attempting to understand in full the purposes of a statute.  The parties who 
formulated it did not themselves fully understand them!   
But even if we were ex ante able fully to understand and formulate the purposes 
of a statute with all proper refinements, we still could not ex ante formulate in full a 
corresponding rule system to address even a minimally complex underlying subject 
matter.  The problem is compounded to the extent the purposes are unrefined.  Reality 
and the cross currents of the purposes of the law are too varied.  This becomes clear on 
considering what would be required ex ante to produce a complete statutory rule system.  
The significance of what follows will be obvious to anyone who has drafted a document 
such as a complex real estate construction contract or corporate merger agreement. The 
number of issues that could be addressed is endless.  In that light, the legislature could 
produce a complete statutory rule system only if it were capable of, inter alia:
(1) thoroughly mastering the underlying subject matter, 
(2) thoroughly refining the purposes to be achieved through the statute, and 
(3) (a) identifying every rule that is necessary or that would be beneficial in 
furthering or achieving the statute’s purposes (or ends) in all possible situations, without 
regard to the rarity, remoteness, or uniqueness of any of such situations, (b) identifying 
every rule that would interfere or conflict with the furthering or achieving of the statute’s 
 
mathematics.  We might prefer more powerful tools in addressing relations between physical phenomena, 
especially in particle physics and cosmology, but our cognitive faculties provide us only with mathematics.   
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purposes, including, in particular, all such rules found in United States Code or state laws 
or derivable from our traditions and customs, and (c) identifying, with respect to the set 
of rules in (3)(b), each rule that, in the legislature’s view, should be subservient to and 
every rule and purpose that should override the ends of the statute at issue, and 
(4), taking all the above into account, (a) except as provided in (b), immediately 
following, incorporating into the statute rules, both substantive and remedial, relating to 
all possible clusters of factual occurrences, without regard to the rarity, remoteness, or 
uniqueness of such clusters, necessary or beneficial in furthering or achieving the 
statute’s ends, (b) expressly excluding from those rules “merely” beneficial rules that the 
legislature deemed to be (i) too harsh in their consequences given their small or virtually 
inconsequential contribution to the ends sought, (ii) too inconsequential or peripheral to 
be worth devoting judicial resources to, or (iii) to conflict with more important, 
overriding ends, and the like, (c) including, if not covered above, all subsidiary rules 
required in applying the primary rules,52 (d) providing exceptions for all rules that, if 
literally applied, would on rare occasions inhibit the furthering or achieving of the 
statute’s ends, with the exception of those necessary to protect ends deemed to override 
those of the statute, which rules would, of course, be included, (e) including all 
exceptions to the general rules necessary to prevent what the legislature deemed to be 
irrational, unfair and unjust results in light of unique circumstances, (f) expressly 
resolving all internal conflicts between statutory provisions and all conflicts between the 
statute and, if not addressed above, all other statutes and the Constitution, (g) expressly 
sanctioning or denying effect to all results flowing from the simultaneous or successive 
application of separate rules, wherein results can be achieved that could not be achieved 
 
52 See text  infra pp. 31-32 and 36-38 and infra note 105. 
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through application of the rules singly,53 and (h) making it clear exactly who is entitled to 
seek the remedies provided by the statute, i.e., whether the statute permits private causes 
of action.54 Further, to render a statute truly complete, the legislature would have to 
assign all words and phrases used in the statute meanings perfectly appropriate to the 
statute’s ends and all other purposes the law is simultaneously pursuing, neither covering 
facts that should not be covered nor excluding facts that should be covered.  Thus, either 
the historical meanings of words and phrases would have to be perfectly suited to the 
needs of the statute or the legislature would have to recognize any inadequacies in those 
meanings and address them with special, nonce, statutory definitions.  In the case of 
words and phrases that have more than one meaning, including prototypical and non-
typical meanings, if one meaning perfectly suited the needs of the statute, it would be 
necessary to specify which.  These issues relating to words and phrases are addressed in 
Part IV.     
Although to an individual who has never undertaken anything comparable, the 
tasks above might, in the abstract, seem difficult but hardly overwhelming, experience 
proves conclusively that they are overwhelming.  Statutes always and inevitably emerge 
from the drafting and enactment processes varying in incompleteness from the extremes 
of the “common law” statute to what the Supreme Court, confusing complexity with 
completeness, has called the “comprehensive and reticulated” statute.  Assuming that 
such extremes are accurate and meaningful categories, given the massive incompleteness 
 
53 For example, through seriatim transactions that each comply with the requirements of the “tax free” 
reorganization provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, parties can effect the distribution of earnings and 
profits taxable as dividends in the form of capital gains.  See Boris I. Bitker & James Eustice, Federal 
Income Taxation of Corporation and Shareholders, ¶¶ 1.05[2][d]. 12.61 [3] (6th ed. 1994; Marvin A. 
Chirelstein & Benjamin B. Lapata, Recent Developments in the Step-Transaction Doctrine, 60 Taxes 970 
(1982)); Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 859 (1982)).  
54 See e.g., the principles discussed in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Jackson v. Birmingham 
Bd. of Education, 309 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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of the paradigm so-called “comprehensive and reticulated” statute, discussed below, a 
statute that emerged lacking literally thousands of pages of rules and no telling how many 
specific rules, there are in between what may be called “typically incomplete” statutes.  
Obviously, the degree to which a statute is substantively or remedially incomplete is a 
function of the difference between the rule system that would truly be complete and the 
rule system actually provided by the text of the statute as well as any differences between 
the historical meanings of the words and phrases used in the statute or their statutory 
definitions and the meanings actually required in light of the statute’s purposes. 
Again, it is crucial to recognize that the incompleteness of statutes is almost 
always not intended by the legislature.55 Consequently, virtually all of the omissions 
relating to any given statute are random and accidental.  When that is the case, giving 
effect to the literal content of the statute cannot but yield purely arbitrary and accidental 
results. 
The following illustrates concretely, and hopefully with a high degree of 
thoroughness, the endemic nature of the problems in the cases of “common law” statutes, 
so-called “comprehensive and reticulated states,” and typical statutes.  
1.  “Common Law” Statutes.
The paradigmatic “common law” statute is, of course, the Sherman Act,56 a 
legislative attempt to deal, at the very least, with socially harmful, anticompetitive 
business conduct.57 The rule scheme envisioned by the Sherman Act was initially highly 
 
55 It is obvious that the legislature occasionally ducks politically sensitive issues and leaves resolution to the 
courts.   
56 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1—11(West 1997).  
57 Some contemporary scholars claim that the Sherman Act was not concerned with the dangers posed to 
democracy by massive aggregations of wealth (that, in spite of the fact that with enough wealth and one can 
buy the repeal of the Sherman Act, which may well have effectively occurred during the Regan 
Administration), that unrestrained competition is somehow “perfect” (a claim that would probably have 
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incomplete for the most obvious of reasons.  Congress did not and could not, under the 
circumstances, begin fully to understand the nature of the problems it faced, was not 
certain about all the problems it wanted to address, and accordingly could not give the 
courts more than general directions to deal with certain aspects of the untoward fall-out 
of the industrial, commercial, and financial developments of the Second Industrial 
Revolution in America.  The purposes of the act were, therefore, in significant ways 
inchoate. 
Congress knew that there were potential problems.  The post-Civil War 
technological advances in industrial and agricultural production, combined with the rail 
connection of the East and West Coasts and the resulting opening up of the Great Plains, 
and significant advances in transoceanic transportation, made possible mass markets that, 
in turn, gave rise to potential economies of scale in financing, production, marketing, and 
distribution not previously possible.  Economies of scale produced economic blessings in 
the form of reduced costs.  To take advantage of those economies of scale required 
aggregations of capital on an unprecedented scale.  The new capital markets, together 
with the legislatively created limited liability business corporation, the creative use of 
that antique device, the trust, to effect combinations of previously independent 
 
convulsed Adam Smith in paroxysms of laughter), and that efficiency and efficiency alone was the concern 
of Congress in passing the Sherman Act.  The author finds those claims incredible.  The agricultural 
interests of the United States in 1890 clearly saw the dangers of aggregations of wealth.  Not that they were 
disinterested observers.  Their once dominant powers were being severely eroded.  To think that they were 
not concerned about political power when they were both losing it and exercising it to secure passage of the 
act is absurd.  Further, to legislators raised on classical history, the lessons of the effects on Roman society 
of the destruction of the independent, citizen farmer (the Roman equivalent of the small, independent 
businessman) that formed the backbone of the Roman Republic would have been clearly before their 
minds.  The author, accordingly, believes that concern with excessive financial and political power was 
almost certainly a concern underlying the Sherman Act.  The author believes that Robert Bork and others 
who focus solely on efficiency may be unwittingly willing to trade American freedom for a mess of pottage 
in the form of a little short-term economic efficiency.  It may well be that we cannot have both maximum 
economic efficiency and political freedom, but rather that political freedom is not free and part of its price 
is an occasional and moderate reduction in efficiency. 
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production units, and finally the general business corporation act with provisions for 
merger and consolidation effectively at will58 resulted in financial and market power, 
labor market effects, and other consequences previously unknown.   
Many recognized that these developments were not all necessarily for the good.  
Massive financial power meant massive political power.  There was no guarantee that 
either would be exercised for the general welfare.  It was also clear that smaller, less 
efficient, producers were being driven out of the market.  Individuals who had been 
educated in the Classics and knew that the demise of the independent Roman farming 
class had doomed the Republic could not but worry that the reduction in the number of 
independent producers would be inimical to American democracy.59 
In addition to all the foregoing, no one fully understood the new economy that 
was developing.  In fact, the analytical tools for understanding it were only in their 
infancy.  Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics, the first mathematically oriented 
and comprehensive treatment of what is now known as micro-economics, appeared in 
 
58 New Jersey enacted the first “modern” general business corporation act in 1875.  Adolf A. Berle, Jr., 
Historical Inheritance of American Corporations, Social Meaning of Legal Concepts, 3 The Powers and 
Duties of Corporate Management 189 (1950).  Under that act the restrictions on the business activities that 
could be conducted through a single corporation and on the ability to merge enterprises and bring disparate 
businesses under common control were effectively removed.  Until that act the most effective way to 
combine separate corporate enterprises, whose purposes were limited under special charters, under unified 
control was through the common law trust.  After the New Jersey act came on the scene, the trust was 
rendered relatively obsolete. 
59 Justice Peckham voiced a similar concern in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 
U.S. 290, 323-24 (1897).  See also Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 632, 43 N.W. 1102, 1110 (1889) (Chief 
Justice Sherwood observing: “[I]t is doubtful if free government can long exist in a country where such 
enormous amounts of money are allowed to be accumulated in the vaults of coroporations.”); 21 Cong. 
Rec. 2598 (1890) (remarks of Senator George regarding the potential elimination of all small capitalists).  It 
was also obvious to labor that capital was gaining immense advantages over labor.  The corporation was 
simply a union with another name and some special legal advantages.  Capitalist could freely form unions, 
called corporations, but labor could not.  Capitalists could join in single enterprises and the combine their 
single enterprises under trusts and holding companies, and finally into single enterprises through merger.  
The capitalists recognized their immense advantages over labor and effectively fought, with the assistance 
of both Congress and the courts, to maintain them until the 1930s.   
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1890, the year of the Sherman Act.60 And until the discipline of micro-economics 
advanced well beyond Marshall’s initial insights, it would prove impossible fully to 
understand the economic issues underlying the act.  The common law had developed 
rules against unreasonable restraints on trade, and in the Seventeenth Century Parliament 
had also outlawed all monopolies except those it specifically authorized.61 But the 
common law concepts of “unreasonable restraint” and “monopoly” were neither clearly 
sufficient nor clearly insufficient to deal with the new phenomena, and if, insufficient, it 
was not clear exactly how.  After a short period of intense confusion,62 the judicial 
response was to treat many kinds of business conduct as per se violative of the act.  More 
recently, that is around eighty years after the act became law, as the discipline of micro-
economics had advanced and judges have become better educated in economic matters, 
much conduct that was proscribed in the era of the broad  per se rules has been found to 
pass muster under a much more flexible and sophisticated “rule of reason.”  Today it is 
even recognized, if only tacitly, that in the rarest circumstances reasonable price fixing is 
unavoidable, in fact, preferable to free market competition, and, therefore, lawful.63 
The resulting economic, social, and political phenomena that for the first time 
emerged after the Civil War ultimately had to be recognized, understood, and addressed 
 
60 Alfred Marshall, Principles Economics (1890).  
61 Statute of Monopolies (1623) 
62 The United States Supreme Court, in its first decision under the act, held that the Sugar Trust, which had 
acquired control of ninety-percent of the sugar manufacturing in the United States, although a virtual 
monopoly, was not covered by the act because the act addressed attempts to monopolize commerce, and 
manufacturing is distinct from commerce!  U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).  In United States v. 
Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1987), the court held that the Sherman Act renders 
illegal all restraints on trade.  Of course, any one who contracts with another in part restrains his ability to 
contract with others and, thereby, somewhat restrains trade.  That would render all contracts illegal 
restraints on trade.  The court rather quickly backed off and held that the act proscribes only “unreasonable 
restraints” on trade.  U.S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (1898) (the opinion of Judge Taft, 
later Chief Justice Taft, was effectively adopted by the United States Supreme Court).  
63 At least that is the way the author reads Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
441 U.S. 1 (1979).   
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over a period of seventy to eighty years through legislation such as the Sherman Act, the 
Interstate Commerce Act,64 the Clayton Act,65 the Federal Trade Commission Act,66 
Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act,67 state public utilities acts, the Securities Act 
of 1933,68 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,69 the Public Utilities Holding Company 
Act,70 the National Labor Relations Act,71 the Labor-Management Relations Act,72 the 
Fair Labor Standards Act,73 a host of other laws, and thousands of cases.  Knowledge and 
understanding increased with time and so did the complexity, completeness, and, 
occasionally, the sophistication and effectiveness of the rule schemes provided by 
statutes.     
At the moment of its enactment, the Sherman Act, accordingly, could not 
practically be more than a command to the federal courts to develop a federal common 
law of permissible and impermissible competitive and anti-competitive business 
behaviors as the courts, and the academy for that matter, might in time come to 
understand them. The statute in many respects could not be more than that because 
neither Congress nor the academy yet had the economic and financial understanding 
necessary for formulating anything but the barest directions for the construction of a rule 
system governing competitive and anti-competitive behaviors in the setting of the Second 
Industrial Revolution and its accompanying financial, marketing, and distribution 
revolutions.  The courts had to create by far the largest portion of the rule system that 
 
64 24 Stat. 379 (ch. 104) (Feb. 4, 1887) (as amended on over one hundred occasions).   
65 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-17 (1914). 
66 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-59 (1914). 
67 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (West 1997). 
68 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77z, 77aa (1997).  
69 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77b-78ll (1997). 
70 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79-79z, 79z1-79z6 (1997). 
71 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-169 (1998). 
72 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141-144, 151-167, 171-187 (1998). 
73 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (1998). 
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now comprises the law of the Sherman Act, and the process has not reached completion 
today.      
2.  “Comprehensive and Reticulated” Statutes.
Virtually everyone recognizes that the relatively rare “common law” statute is 
highly incomplete.  What does not seem to be generally recognized is that all statutes 
addressing complex matters are incomplete, often highly incomplete.  This fact can be 
readily illustrated in the case of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(“ERISA’).74 The Supreme Court, confusing complexity with completeness, has on 
several occasions erroneously called ERISA a “comprehensive and reticulated” statute.75 
But, as the following discussion explains, ERISA emerged lacking literally thousands of 
pages of necessary and appropriate rules and no telling how many specific rules per 
“missing” page.  Given the complexity of the subject matters ERISA addresses, the rule 
system embodied in the statutory text per se is neither comprehensive nor highly 
reticulated, although it is complex.  ERISA’s rule scheme, as textually stated, is, in fact, 
highly skeletal.76 
For example, many rules necessary for ensuring that one of ERISA’s paramount 
purposes, i.e., protecting and providing for the sound management of financial resources 
 
74 The provisions of what was originally ERISA are currently largely found at 29 U.S.C. §§1104—1144 
and 1301—1461 and 26 U.S.C. 401—415 and 4974—4975 (2000).   
75 Nachman v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 
Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 113 (1989); Mertens v. Hewett & 
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993). 
76 To truly understand the subject matters that ERISA addresses, especially employer sponsored pension 
and health plans, requires a degree in actuarial science, mathematics, or physics.  The best pension/health 
plan consultants the employer worked with in private practice had at least a master’s degree in 
mathematics, and one held a doctorate in mathematics while another held a doctorate in physics.  All of 
these individuals admitted that the mathematical relations they worked with in plan design are so complex 
that they could not intuit answers but, rather, actually had to “crunch” the numbers.  That being the case, 
Congress was certainly not going to provide all the rules necessary for governing pension and health plans.  
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set aside to provide benefits to pension77 and welfare plan78 participants, are missing.  
ERISA refers to such financial resources as “plan assets.”  However, the term, “plan 
assets,” given the historical meaning of the term “assets,” was not fully appropriate to 
ERISA’s purposes.  Twelve years after ERISA’s enactment, the Department of Labor had 
to supply a more appropriate meaning through a modestly complex regulation.79 Further, 
to secure the safety of plan financial resources, ERISA subjects parties who control and 
manage the financial resources of employee benefit plans to fiduciary duties.80 These 
duties are stated in three or four relatively short statutory provisions.  In comparison, the 
standard treatises devote dozens of pages to explaining fiduciary duties. 81 There are, in 
addition, thousands of cases decided at common law and under state trust codes 
explicating and refining fiduciary duties.  And, of course, it is not always possible to 
harmonize these cases.  Regarding fiduciary duties and the nuances those duties entail, 
 
77 For purposes of ERISA, a pension plan is any plan, whether traditional defined benefit plan or not, that 
that defers compensation to the termination of employment or retirement. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(2)(A)(1990). 
78 Welfare plans provide non-pension benefits, most importantly health, accident, disability, and life 
insurance benefits.  29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(1) (1990). 
79 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(2004).  One of ERISA’s purposes is to protect the assets of employee benefit 
plans, especially from mismanagement and self-dealing by fiduciaries.   However when the phrase “plan 
assets” is understood in terms of the common law meaning of “asset,” the act contains a substantial gap in 
protection.  Plan assets can be converted into non-plan assets, under the common law definition, and yet be 
the economic equivalent of plan assets. For example, the assets of a corporation are not the assets of the 
shareholders.  Manipulative parties can readily convert plan assets into interests in entities, the assets which 
are not assets of the plans in traditional parlance.  Yet, the assets of the entities can economically and 
practically be the equivalent of assets of the plans that invest in them.  It was, therefore, necessary to refine, 
by expansion, ERISA’s purpose of protecting plan assets by redefining the term “plan assets” to include the 
underlying assets in certain entities in which employee plans invest.  Another way of stating the result is to 
say that one of ERISA’s purposes was not simply to protect financial resources contributed to plans while 
such resources remained in the form of common law assets, but rather to provide protection even when 
such resources are converted into other forms as long as it makes sense to view them economically and 
practically as substantially equivalent to common law assets.   
80 For purposes of ERISA a party is a fiduciary with respect to an employee benefit plan, inter alia, to the 
extent the party “exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of 
such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets . . ..”  29 
U.S.C.A. § 1002(21)(A) (West 1999). 
81 Compare, e.g., the scope of the treatment of fiduciary duties in 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1104, 1105, 1106, and 
1109 (West 1999), with the treatments of fiduciary duties in George Gleason Bogert, George Taylor Bogert 
& Amy Morris Hess, The Law of Trusts and Trustees (rev. 2nd ed. 1984); Austin Wakeman Scott & 
William Franklin Frachter, The Law of Trusts (4th ed. 1987).  
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ERISA is textually highly abbreviated and incomplete.  Accordingly, to create a body of 
fiduciary law that is not set out in the text of this “comprehensive and reticulated statute,” 
the federal courts have been required to develop what is in fact a potentially substantial 
“federal common law of trusts.”82 
ERISA also requires that all plan assets be held either in trust or in insured 
arrangements.83 Many employers elect to have the plans that they sponsor hold all or part 
of their assets in trust.  However, through a provision that was added to the act at the last 
minute and without any time for deep—or even shallow, for that matter—reflection on its 
ultimate consequences, ERISA preempts all state laws that relate to employee benefit 
plans.84 The purpose of the preemption provision is not only to protect the federal 
statutory scheme from state infringement but also to ease plan administration by insuring 
uniformity of the law applicable to employee benefit plans.85 State trust laws are clearly 
among the state laws that relate to employee benefit plans that hold plan assets in trust.  
Since state trust laws may prohibit conduct that ERISA permits and may permit conduct 
that ERISA prohibits, state trust laws are clearly one of the types of state law that ERISA 
was intended to preempt.  However, in spite of the fact that ERISA requires plan assets to 
be held in trust and simultaneously preempts all state trust laws, ERISA does not contain 
a federal trust code.  Rather, it contains little more than one line requiring that plan assets 
be held in trust.  That is a substantial gap, or omission, in the substantive scheme of the 
law.  That also has been one of the impelling motives behind the development of a 
federal common law of trusts.   
 
82 See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). 
83 29 U.S.C.A. §1103 (West 1999). 
84 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144 (West 1999). 
85 See, e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987); Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 
8 F.3d 335 (6th Cir. 1993).  
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Further, although one of the paramount purposes underlying ERISA’s fiduciary 
duties was the protection of plan financial resources, ERISA’s does not contain any 
general substantive rules governing the conduct of non-fiduciaries who may act in 
concert with plan fiduciaries to cause losses of plan assets.  Neither does ERISA’s text 
contain any general rules governing the conduct of those who provide services to plans 
but are not fiduciaries.86 Since ERISA preempts all state laws that relate to employee 
benefit plans, it would appear, in light of ERISA’s text alone, that those who aid and abet 
plan fiduciaries in breaches of duty and non-fiduciary professionals, such as lawyers, 
accountants, and actuaries, who engage in malpractice are at liberty to do so.87 Courts, 
not surprisingly, have on occasion intervened and effectively created substantive rules 
and remedies in spite of the absence of statutory text.88 
Of course, since ERISA contains no general substantive rules addressing the 
conduct of non-fiduciaries, it also contains no remedial provisions regarding the conduct 
of such persons.  So in the case of non-fiduciaries, ERISA lacks both substantive and 
remedial provisions.89 
86 Certain parties, called “disqualified persons” in I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2) (2002) and “parties in interest” under 
§ 3(14) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002 (14) (West 1999), who may not be fiduciaries, are subject to excise 
taxes for engaging in various categories of what are called “prohibited transactions.”  I.R.C. §4975(a), (b), 
and (c) (West 2002).  There is, however, no provision in ERISA that subjects non-fiduciaries to liability to 
employee benefit plans.   
87 The failure to provide substantive rules prohibiting the actions of aiders and abettors of fiduciary 
breaches and providing for malpractice liability for non-fiduciary professional service providers to 
employee benefit plans might appear to be an odd omission until one reflects on the fact that one of the 
driving forces impelling the enactment of ERISA was a series of serious breaches of fiduciary duty by both 
union and corporate sponsors of plans.  The problems posed by aiders and abettors and professionals 
engaging in malpractice were simply nowhere on the radar screen either when the substantive provisions of 
ERISA were being crafted or when ERISA’s preemption clause was added at the last moment before 
passage.   
88 See infra note 154. 
89 In contrast, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a—78mm (West 2003), contained 
clear prohibitions on fraud in connection with the sales and purchases of securities, but it contained no 
remedies for fraud.  The courts, not surprisingly, found an implied remedy.  Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 
73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). 
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The above are only a miniscule fraction of the issues for which the text of ERISA 
fails to provide a rule.90 The degree to which even a supposedly “comprehensive and 
reticulated” statute is incomplete is evidenced in the difference between ERISA’s 
approximately 220 pages of none too compact initial text91 and the rules in that text and 
the thousands of pages of text and even greater number of rules contained in the 
aggregate of the Treasury Department Regulations (877 pages of small, double column 
print that dwarf the original statutory provisions) relating to the act92 (not all of which 
have been promulgated even after thirty-one years) and useful substantive information in 
the preambles to those regulations; Treasury Department Revenue Rulings, private letter 
rulings, Revenue Procedures, General Counsel Memoranda, Technical Advice 
Memoranda, and the like; Department of Labor and Pension Benefit Guarantee 
 
90 Congress recognized with respect to ERISA that it was producing an incomplete rule scheme.  The 
statute, accordingly called for many regulations.  In such cases there was a conscious recognition by 
Congress of specific gaps in the statutory rule system.  When it is highly obvious that this is so, Congress 
often expressly delegates authority to a regulatory agency to promulgate regulations designed to render the 
law more complete.  Of course, Congress does not always recognize the gaps, or does not always expressly 
recognize them, and the need to deal with these matters lands in the lap of the courts.  The task facing the 
courts and the regulatory agencies is essentially the same.  Since even the regulatory agencies cannot 
thoroughly complete the law, the courts always end up with the residual cases for which no one else, 
Congress or the regulatory agencies, has provided a result.  
Some of the regulations under ERISA were required to address questions of commencement of 
participation in employer sponsored pension and welfare plans, the counting of service under plans, accrual 
of plan benefits, actuarial requirements for pension plan funding, vesting in benefits under pension plans, 
calculation of employer liabilities for withdrawal from multi-employer pension plans, the calculation of 
payments to the benefit insurance program to be established by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 
and, under the Internal Revenue Code’s qualification provisions, guidelines designed to prevent 
discrimination in either contributions or benefits under pension plans in favor of highly compensated 
employees.  The regulations regarding pension plan benefit accrual and funding, multi-employer plan 
withdrawal liabilities, and the discrimination of benefits in favor of highly compensated employees had to 
include complex actuarial guidelines, matters far beyond the expertise of the average member of Congress.  
And the authorized regulations were not the end of the story.  The regulatory agencies have had to establish 
many additional rules through interpretive regulations that the agencies hoped the courts would uphold as 
valid interpretations of the statute.    
91 The original text of ERISA, P.L. 93-406; 86 Stat. 829, required 252 pages in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N., 
beginning at page 935.  A number of pages of text are duplicitous in that a number of labor law and tax 
rules in Titles I and II are mirror image provisions.  Eleven pages of the statute concern agency 
administrative matters, and some additional material does not state rules but specifies where in existing 
laws amendments should be inserted.   Altogether, the actual, non-duplicitous rules probably constitute 
around 220 pages. 
92 The overly curious can find the majority of these regulations in 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.401—1.420-1 (2004). 
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Corporation Regulations (656 pages of small, double column print that dwarf the original 
statutory provisions) relating to the act93 (not all of which have been promulgated even 
after thirty-one years) and useful substantive information in the preambles to those 
regulations, Department of Labor and Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Advisory 
Opinions and Opinion Letters; over twenty volumes of trial and appellate court 
opinions;94 and scholarly commentary addressing matters not resolved by all of the 
foregoing, even when all duplicative and unnecessary text in those various sources is 
disregarded.  And the resulting aggregate thousands of pages of text and even more 
numerous rules contained therein still do not come close to addressing all questions that 
arise in the course of practice in the employee benefits arena.  That is, in part, because 
regulations, rulings, opinions letters, and cases always raise questions as well as provide 
answers.  There are thousands of issues relating to this “comprehensive and reticulated” 
statute arising out an unlimited number of unanticipated, sometimes unique, 
circumstances that have not yet been authoritatively addressed. 
It is obvious that even approaching a truly complete Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act, given the driving purposes underlying the act, would—in fact, 
does—require many thousands of pages of highly compact text.  If society had been 
required to wait for the statute’s protections until the statute had been rendered textually 
complete, there would never have been an ERISA.95 Indeed, the best that Congress could 
do, given the constraints of time under which it operated, was to provide many essentials 
 
93 The overly curious can find the majority of these regulations in 29 C.F.R. §§ 2509.75-2—4907.170 
(2003).   
94 See the Employee Benefit Cases volumes published in connection with the BNA Pension & Benefits 
Reporter.  Even that collection of ERISA cases is not exhaustive, as the author has learned on running 
Lexis and WestLaw searches. 
95 That would fulfill with a vengeance Thomas Jefferson’s belief that the government that governs best 
governs least.  Were Congress to wait until it could provide complete statutory schemes covering all 
possible contingencies, it would, in fact, govern not at all. 
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and rely on the regulatory agencies, practitioners, and courts to navigate to many desired 
results that could not be addressed ex ante. That is the case, in greater or lesser degree, 
with every statute.  As things stand, ERISA, rather ironically, stands for the proposition 
that the more “comprehensive and reticulated” a statute is, the more the work that will 
fall on administrative agencies and courts in rendering it substantially complete. 
3.  “Typical” Statutes.
In between the statutes above are those statutes that no one has ever viewed as 
either “common law” or “comprehensive and reticulated” statutes.  As rule systems, these 
statutes are all in significant ways incomplete.  Consider, for example, Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).96 
The purposes of Title VII are to discourage discrimination against individuals in 
hiring or with respect to any term or condition of employment on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin and to compensate individuals who have suffered 
discrimination.97 While it may be conceptually mandatory that employers be parties 
liable for discrimination, once that decision has been made it is necessary to decide, inter 
alia, who is an employer, who is an employee or potential employee,98 and whether one 
 
96 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e—2000e-17 (1994). 
97 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). 
98 The determination of who is to be treated as an employee is not a simple matter.  Because of the different 
purposes underlying various labor and employment related legislation courts have had to tailor the 
definition of “employee” to render it appropriate to various acts in which it appears.  These definitions are 
in large part pragmatically justified judicial contributions to the American English lexicon.  See, e.g., 
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1943) and Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 
(1946) (the court held that the word “employee” for purposes of National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 152) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 203(e)) means, generally, “common law 
employees and certain individuals who satisfy criteria (in part different under each act) that would 
generally render individuals independent contractors.”)  Justice Jackson pointed out that the common law 
test for employees was devised for the primary purpose of “deciding whether one who hires another is 
responsible in tort for his wrongdoing.”  Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. at 125.  That purpose was 
significantly different from the purposes underlying the acts at issue, and the court made modifications in 
the concept of “employee” to bring it into line with the purposes of the acts.  A priori there is nothing to 
37
employer is to be held liable for causing another to discriminate.99 The act contains no 
rules addressing these issues.  A complete rule system would also either exhaustively 
define or catalogue all the acts that constitute discrimination.100 Congress made no 
attempt to do that.  In addition, although it was decided to limit liability to employers as 
entities, the act did not specify all the circumstances in which an employer is deemed to 
act.  Since a corporation, for example, always acts through agents, a complete rule system 
would necessarily specify when a corporation is to be liable for which acts of which of its 
agents.101 There was no attempt to specify whether all employees are agents of their 
employers for purposes of Title VII, or whether only limited classes of employees are 
deemed to be agents.102 Further, the act did not specify whether failures by employees 
and other agents to act are to be treated as acting.103 Nor did the act specify whether all 
employees and agents are deemed the same for all purposes of the foregoing 
determinations.104 A complete rule system addressing those matters would have required 
supplying agency and vicarious liability rules consonant with the answers.  One might 
 
lead one to believe that a classification appropriate to the allocation of enterprise liability would be 
perfectly suited to other legal objectives. 
99 See, e.g., the case annotations to 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e) (1994) nos. 107-166 and the cases addressing, 
e.g., whether and when two employers are to be deemed a single employer and who is deemed to have 
actual control over employment.  
100 The courts were required to determine, e.g., whether facially neutral employment criteria having adverse 
impact on a protected class, managerial inactivity in the face of harassment of a protected class, and same 
sex harassment constituted “discrimination.”  See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding 
that facially neutral employment criteria that have an adverse impact on a protected class are actionable 
unless job related and consistent with business necessity, terms hardly paragons of precision); Meritor 
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (harassment of a protected class that an employer allows 
can constitute discrimination); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (harassment is to be 
judged from the perspective of a “reasonable person”); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 
U.S. 75 (1998) (same sex harassment is actionable). 
101 See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 
U.S. 775 (1986). 
102 Id. 
103 Id.  
104 Id. 
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expect that the answers and rules would vary depending on the type of discriminatory 
conduct at issue and who is engaging in it.105 No such rules were supplied. 
One of the more perplexing problems regarding Title VII simultaneously involved 
the substance of the act, the law of evidence, and the rules of procedure.  It turned out 
that Title VII required its own special rules of evidence and procedure, which, in turn, 
highlighted a need for a substantive addition.  The problem was how to prove 
discrimination when an employer employed facially neutral employment criteria that 
excluded members of a protected class from employment.  That is, suppose an employer 
requires all successful job applicants to hold a high school diploma.  Suppose, further, 
that many of the jobs the employer holds out, such as sweeping and cleaning, do not 
require the level of education associated with a high school diploma.  And, then, suppose 
finally it turns out that a smaller proportion of a protected minority than of the majority in 
the relevant job market holds high school diplomas.106 Proving discrimination in such 
situations required resort to statistical methods, in no wise even hinted at in Title VII, 
whereby a sufficient disparity between the qualified members of a protected class 
employed by a given employer and the available pool of qualified members of the 
protected class in the relevant labor market was deemed sufficient evidence of 
discrimination to establish a prima facie case.107 The courts decided that when such a 
case was established, the employer should be permitted to rebut it by showing that the 
employment criteria were “job related and consistent with business necessity.”108 The 
 
105 As Lance Liebman, Director of the American Law Institute observes in the forward to the Restatement 
(Third) of Agency, Tentative Draft No. 1, special rules of agency have evolved in employment law.   
106 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
107 See Griggs, supra note 106; Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).  42 U.S.C.A § 2000(e)-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994), codifies the “disparate 
impact” theory of discrimination.   
108 Griggs, supra note 106. 
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substantive fall out was that what might be truly unintended discrimination, negligent 
discrimination, if you will, was declared illegal along with intentional discrimination.109 
Many of the matters above that were not addressed by the textual rule system of 
Title VII have, of necessity, been filled in by the courts.  There are, of course, hundreds 
of additional matters that have had to be judicially decided to further the process of 
completing Title VII’s rule system.  A run through the annotations to Title VII in the 
United States Code Annotated will give a nice sample, although those cases do not begin 
to be exhaustive, and there are state laws with language identical or similar to that in Title 
VII that address matters not yet addressed under Title VII.  Admittedly, not every case 
annotated truly provides a missing rule.  Some are duplicitous.  Still, the number is not 
trivial. 
In addition to the cases, of course, there are the Title VII regulations, many being 
interpretive, addressing a variety of matters that the text of the statute omitted.110 And 
after nearly forty years the need for additional rules continues to surface.  We apparently 
have not yet encountered in reported cases every single behavior and combination of 
facts for which a rule must be established if the purposes of Title VII are to be effected.  
There is no reason to believe we ever will.111 
109 Griggs, supra note 106, at 424. 
110 See 29 C.F.R. 1601.1—1604.11, 1605.1—1605.3, 1606.1—1606.8, 1607.1—1607.8, 1608.1—1608. 12 
(2005). 
111 Regarding inherent incompleteness, statutory rule systems and common law rule systems are quite 
similar.  The primary differences are, inter alia: (1) the relevant intentions and purposes in statutory rule 
systems are those of the legislature and in the common law rule systems those of the courts, which 
hopefully reflect community values, (2) it more often take courts an extended period of time to determine 
and refine the purposes they want to pursue, and (3) common law rule systems begin life more incomplete 
than do statutory rule systems.  Courts have traditionally been loathe to formulate on their own complex, 
detailed rule systems, with manifold exceptions and special modifications to the meanings of words, absent 
issues in actual controversy.  Courts are also reluctant to address matters in anticipation of future litigation.   
Common law courts use the principle of holding to limit the scope of their opinions so that they retain 
freedom to deal with overlooked and unanticipated matters in light of the policies giving rise to their rule 
systems.  Legislators, in contrast, attempt to anticipate and address ex ante a myriad of matters in a statute 
40
If we move from illustrative anecdotes to system, we find there are at least sixteen 
types of ways in which statutes can emerge from the enactment process incomplete.  The 
first four relate to the purposes of statutes. 
First, although, as noted above, cognitive science, pragmatics, epistemology, and 
the philosophy of mind make it clear that the purpose or purposes of a statute are among 
the most essential elements in understanding the human behavior evidenced in a statute 
and the behavior it is supposed to induce, statutes occasionally emerge with little or no 
articulation of purposes.112 Further, no individual or group of individuals, whether 
legislators or legislative staffs, has the intelligence, prescience, creative imagination, or 
time, ex ante to uncover or anticipate all the possible clusters of actions, behaviors, 
events, circumstances, relations, consequences, and the like “facts” that reality can 
present over time.  As a result, the purposes of a statute, i.e., the results it has been 
designed to achieve, not only occasionally emerge with little or no articulation, or only 
vague articulation, they occasionally emerge in part inchoate,113 almost always, if not 
always, without full specification of scope, and almost always without fully refined 
lexical statements.  The issues presented by the last three items are not self-identifying.  
Rather, the issues become apparent only when overlooked or unanticipated facts surface 
and reveal that the reasonably ascertainable purposes of a law, as initially formulated, are 
in need of significant completion, clarification of scope, or lexical refinement.    
that they believe will or are likely to arise.   But the differences between statutory and common law rule 
systems are matters of degree.  And, as long as courts pursue consistent purposes in connection with the 
development of common law rule systems, anticipation of future developments in the common law and the 
interpretation of statues are virtually identical processes.  
112 Both the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1—11 (West 1997), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12—17 
(1914), omit recitations of purposes.  Why that is so is explained supra text at pp. 25-30. 
113 See, e.g., the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1—11 (West 1997). 
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As a practical matter, a statute’s purposes must be initially formulated on the basis 
of a limited set of potential behaviors, occurrences, and the like.  These behaviors, 
occurrences, and the like are what bring a problem requiring legislative action to the 
attention of interested parties.  These behaviors, occurrences, and the like can be called 
“paradigmatic facts.”  The purposes of the statute will, inevitably, be conceptualized and 
stated in terms of the paradigmatic facts.  In the case of some statutes the paradigmatic 
facts are an exceptionally small subset of the entire set of facts that need to be addressed 
through the statute.  That was the case with the Sherman Act.  With micro-economics in 
its infancy, in fact, a mere new born on the date of enactment, and the full implications of 
the second industrial and accompanying financial and institutional revolutions only dimly 
perceived, no one could fully understand the problems that the act would need to address.  
Accordingly, the purposes of the Sherman Act emerged in part inchoate.   
The Sherman Act represents a somewhat rare extreme.  Much more commonly, a 
statute covers a significantly complete set of paradigmatic facts.114 In virtually all such 
instances, it is, nonetheless, necessary over time to refine the scopes of a statute’s 
purposes.   
When a statutory purpose is initially formulated, its scope is likely to be textually 
either or both too narrow or too expansive.  Suppose, for example, a statute is designed, 
inter alia, to prevent the behaviors evidenced in a given set of paradigmatic facts because 
those behaviors cause injury that public policy demands be curtailed.  The behaviors 
present in the paradigmatic facts may not, however, be the entire set of behaviors that can 
give rise to the injury in question.  There may be overlooked and unanticipated behaviors 
 
114 That is because a great deal more is known about the underlying subject matter to which the law is to 
apply than was the case with the Sherman Act.   
42
that can be called “non-conceptual equivalents” of the behaviors present in the 
paradigmatic facts,115 behaviors that, although not conceptually identical to the 
paradigmatic behaviors, possibly conceptually quite distinct,116 can, nonetheless, give rise 
to the injury of concern.  Such non-conceptual equivalents may not be surfaced at any 
point during the formulation of the statute’s rule system.  In fact, non-conceptual 
equivalents may not even exist when a statute is enacted but, rather, may be concocted 
long after the statue is enacted as parties, with the assistance of counsel, creatively seek 
ways to evade its strictures.  Lawyers are often highly rewarded for concocting schemes 
for accomplishing results that statutes are designed to prevent.  They do so by finding 
alternative ways of accomplishing those results that are not conceptually captured by the 
words and phrases used in statutory rules.117 To the extent non-conceptual equivalents 
are not recognized or anticipated and included within a statute’s coverage, the scope of 
the statutory purposes relating to those non-conceptual equivalents will be too narrow and 
the statute will not textually reach as far as it should.   
 
115 We often encounter non-conceptual equivalents in the law.  For example, a corporate merger can be the 
equivalent of a simple amendment to the articles of incorporation; a common law trust can be designed as 
the equivalent of a holding company; a trust certificate can be the equivalent of a stock certificate; a 
corporate leveraged buyout can be the equivalent of an illegal dividend distribution creating an illegal, 
fraudulent preference or asset distribution in favor of stockholders over unsecured creditors (see In re Bay 
Plastics, Inc., 187 B.R. 315 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995)); a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding can produce 
results equivalent to a Chapter 7 proceeding that cannot be instituted because the debtor has secured a 
Chapter 7 discharge within the prior six years (see, e.g., In the Matter of Strauss, 184 B.R. 349 (Bankr. D. 
Neb. 1995)); and a series of tax free reorganizations can be equivalent to a dividend distribution (see, e.g.,
the discussion of the step-transaction doctrine, Boris I. Bitker & James Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of 
Corporation and Shareholders, ¶¶ 1.05[2][d]. 12.61 [3] (6th ed. 1994; Marvin A. Chirelstein & Benjamin B. 
Lapata, Recent Developments in the Step-Transaction Doctrine, 60 Taxes 970 (1982)); Joseph Isenbergh, 
Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 859 (1982)); and it is possible through 
contractual arrangements to create an economic entity that is equivalent to what can be achieved through 
merger.  Rotherby Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
116 To take one example from the immediately preceding footnote, a corporate merger and an amendment to 
the articles of incorporation are conceptually distinct, although the former can be a vehicle for the latter. 
117 Occasionally, a particular way of achieving a given result, not the result, is what creates a concern.   In 
such instances, the results may be quite socially useful.  When that is true, lawyers who assist in the 
creation of alternative ways of achieving the results that do not give rise to the original concerns are true 
problem solvers rather than simple manipulators.    
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For example, clever tax lawyers discovered that by properly sequencing a series 
of “tax free” corporate reorganizations and following up with a corporate liquidation, one 
could effectively distribute corporate earnings and profits, taxable as ordinary income, in 
what was in form a sale or exchange of a capital asset, thereby miraculously converting 
ordinary income into capital gains.118 Although a series of corporate reorganizations 
followed by a corporate liquidation is conceptually distinct from a dividend declaration 
and payment, the economic effect can be identical.  Avoidance of ordinary income tax 
through legal manipulations that have no economic substance was never what the tax free 
reorganization provisions were intended to allow.  That was implicit, albeit not express, 
in the in totality of the scheme for corporate taxation.   
But there is an additional problem.  Assuming again that the statute at issue is 
concerned to prevent or discourage an injurious form of behavior, there may be injuries 
that are so similar to—even if not in every respect identical to—those evidenced in 
connection with the paradigmatic facts and non-conceptual equivalents that no rational 
actors would act to prevent the latter without also acting to prevent the former.119 The 
behaviors that give rise to these injuries may be called “substantial equivalents.”120 Some 
 
118 Bitker & Eustice, supra note 115; Chirelstein & Lapata, supra note 115; Isenbergh, supra note 115. 
119 Thus, although the Fair Labor Standards Act’s provisions for minimum wages was based on a 
paradigmatic concern with the wages of common law employees, individuals over whom an employer 
exercises the power to hire and fire, usually at will, and with respect to whom an employer dictates not only 
the job to be preformed, but how, when, and where to perform it (and usually supplies the place and 
equipment for work), it soon became clear that independent contractors required the same protections even 
though the relations between independent contractors and the employers with whom the contract are 
significantly different from the relationship between employer and employee.  Also, to preclude employers 
form converting employees to independent contractors on every occasion on which it might be feasible to 
do so, it became necessary to treat all persons who render services to an employer or are suffered to render 
services as in the same class or purposes of the minimum wage protections.  See 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(d), (e), 
and (g).  
120 Antitrust law is replete with substantial equivalents.  Price fixing and territorial division, for example, 
are effective ways to achieve the benefits of monopoly without actually achieving true monopoly status.  
Further, there are several substantial equivalents to direct price fixing, one being the sharing of otherwise 
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or all of the substantial equivalents may also be overlooked or not anticipated during the 
formulation of the statute.  Further, as is the case with non-conceptual equivalents, parties 
may devise substantial equivalents well after the statute is enacted.   
Since, absent highly unusual circumstances, the intention of the parties 
formulating a statute, were they to uncover or anticipate them, would virtually always be 
to address the aggregate of paradigmatic facts and non-conceptual and substantial 
equivalents, an intention to cover non-conceptual and substantial equivalents along with 
the paradigmatic facts must rationally be presumed.  No rational, honest actor would 
intentionally cover the paradigmatic facts but omit coverage of non-conceptual and 
substantial equivalents.  When non-conceptual and substantial equivalents are omitted 
due to oversight or the failure to or inability to anticipate then, the statute’s purposes, as 
ascertainable from text alone, will be too narrow, and the statute will not reach as far as it 
should and would but for oversight and the failure or inability to anticipate.  The scope of 
its purposes ascertainable from text alone will be too narrow. 
 Of course, the scope of statutory purposes can also be textually too expansive.  
Even if all behaviors giving rise to paradigmatic facts and non-conceptual and substantial 
equivalents were identified and covered by the statute’s strictures, those facts could occur 
with other facts in light of which it would be irrational, pointless, or unfair to impose the 
statute’s strictures.  These facts may be called “exceptional fact aggregates.”  For 
example, imposing the strictures of a statute in the face of the additional facts could on 
occasion produce results contrary to the very purposes of the statute.121 It is also possible 
 
proprietary cost, production, and pricing information so that producers can engage in “conscious 
parallelism” and tacit agreements in their pricing.  
121 Thus, the owners or managers of an enterprise competing in a market without significant barriers to 
entry and purely on the merits through continuous innovation and superior service, and in no wise abusing 
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that imposing statutory strictures, although not yielding a result contrary to the purposes 
of the statute, would, nonetheless, not only fail to advance the purposes of the statute but 
would serve no sound purpose at all.122 In these instances, if the law were, for example, 
punitive, application of the law would impose a penalty that senselessly harms.123 Or, the 
 
its financial, marketing, or other power, and refraining from anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions, may 
intend to drive all the competitors of the business out of the market and become the sole supplier in that 
market, and in fact do so.  Such conduct would not generally be viewed as subject to the anti-
monopolization strictures of the anti-trust laws because to so class it would dampen what the anti-trust laws 
are designed to do—foster and protect competition on the merits.  If successful, such a competitor, although 
in one sense a monopolist, i.e., sole economic actor in a given market, would also be the perfect competitor, 
operating so efficiently, keeping costs and prices so low, innovating so effectively, and commanding such 
customer loyalty through superior products and services that, in spite of the absence of significant barriers 
to entry, no one would want to attempt to enter the market.  The enterprise also would not earn monopoly 
profits. 
122 This appears to be one of the rationales that gave rise to the decision in Church of the Holy Trinity v. 
United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).  Congress had made it illegal to “in any way assist . . . the importation . 
. . of any alien . . . into the United States, . . . under contract or agreement . . . made previous to the 
importation . . . of such alien, . . . to perform labor or service of any kind in the United States . . ..”  Act of 
February 26, 1885, 23 Stat. 332, c. 164.  The Episcopal Church of the Holy Trinity entered into an 
agreement with an Anglican minister residing in England pursuant to which the minister would immigrate 
to the United States and become the minister of the church.  The statute in question literally covered the 
transaction.  However, the statue was clearly designed to protect the American working class from the 
wage competition and wage depression resulting from the massive importation of cheap foreign labor.  “All 
the supporters of the bill who spoke during the floor debates saw its purpose to be preventing the 
importation of “laborers” who would undermine the wage position of American wage earners, the precise 
purpose articulated in the committee reports and in the Supreme Court opinion.”  William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1509, 1538-39 (1998).  There was, however, no such 
problem presented in the case before the court.  Anglican ministers were not in excess supply.  As the court 
noted: “It was never suggested that we had in this country a surplus of brain toilers, and, least of all, that 
the market for the services of Christian ministers was depressed by foreign competition.”  Church of the 
Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 464.  The court, accordingly, held that the importation of the minister was not 
covered by the statute’s prohibition.  This logic is recognized in the current H1B visa program pursuant to 
which employers can petition to employ foreign nationals who have unique qualifications that cannot be 
satisfied out of the available pool of talent in the United States.  For opposing viewpoints regarding the 
decision in Church of the Holy Trinity, see, e.g.,  Scalia, supra note 4, at 18-23; William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1509 (1998).  In the author’s view, the statute in 
question represents a case of what may be called “protectively overly broad drafting,” drafting that is not be 
viewed literally without close regard to underlying purposes.  This technique is used when the parties 
drafting cannot identify the precise category or categories they want to cover and are concerned that due to 
the tendency toward literalness displayed by some judges some “fact types” they want to cover but cannot 
ex ante identify may escape coverage.  They, therefore, select words or phrases that sweep so broadly that 
all matters that should be covered, given the purposes of the law, will virtually certainly be encompassed.  
It is the responsibility of intelligent interpreters to determine when the statute’s purposes do not require 
coverage.  For possibly the most famous, or infamous, example of protectively overly broad drafting, see 
infra text at pp. 62-64 and note 154. 
123 Thus, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A §§ 651-700 (1999), the purpose of 
which is to provide workers with safe and healthful work places (29 U.S.C.A. § 651(b) (1999)), requires 
employers, inter alia, to comply with all occupational safety and health standards promulgated by the 
Secretary of Labor.  29 U.S.C.A. § 654(b) (West 1999).  The act provides that those who fail to comply are 
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benefits of imposing the strictures could be de minimis yet grossly unfair and unjust.  
Further, imposing the strictures could further the statute’s purposes in a significant way 
but, nonetheless, run counter to an overriding purpose or set of purposes, including those 
evidenced in other statutes or the Constitution.124 
The practical matter is that if exceptional fact aggregates are overlooked or not 
anticipated while a statute is being formulated, there will be no textual exceptions 
provided for them.  When exceptional fact aggregates are not textually excluded, the 
statute will be purposively incomplete in that it will reach further than actually intended.  
And, of course, there can be facts that should be treated as exceptions to these exceptions, 
facts that may be called “extra-exceptional fact aggregates.”  If these are not addressed, 
but exceptional fact aggregates are, the statute will fail to extend as far as it should.125 
While addressing non-conceptual and substantial equivalents, exceptional fact 
aggregates, and extra-exceptional fact aggregates often requires additions to text (on 
 
subject to monetary penalties and must abate non-conforming conditions.  29 U.S.C.A. § 666 (West 1999).  
The act, itself, however, also provides that “[t]he Secretary may prescribe procedures for the issuance of a 
notice in lieu of a citation with respect to de minimis violations [of promulgated safety and health 
standards] which have no direct or immediate relationship to safety or health.”  29 U.S.C.A. 658(a) (West 
1999).  The Occupational Safety and Health Administration has provided standards for notices of de 
minimis violations in the Field Inspection Manual, Chapter III—Inspection Documentation C.2.g (issued 
by OSHA Instruction CPL 2.103, Sept. 26, 1994).  Such notices are to be issued, inter alia, when: 
(1) . . . An employer complies with the clear intent of the standard but deviates from its 
particular requirements in a manner that has no direct or immediate relationship to 
employee safety or health. 
(2) An employer complies with a proposed standard or amendment . . . rather than the 
standard in effect at the time of the inspection and the employer’s action clearly 
provides equal or greater protection . . .. 
(3) An employer’s workplace is at the “state of the art” which is technically beyond the 
requirements of the applicable standard and provides equivalent or more effective 
employee safety or health protection. 
De minimis violations do not give rise to either monetary penalties or an obligation to abate.  The logic was 
that in such circumstances penalties and abatement i.e., compliance with specific safety and health 
standards, would not advance the purposes of the law and would, therefore, be pointless. 
124 To lean on common law for an analogy, the privilege of self-defense in battery overrides the general 
prohibition on intentionally striking others in harmful ways.  This principle is also obviously operating in 
Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889), in that the statutory prohibition of murder precludes 
allowing murderers to benefit from their illegal conduct, since doing so would tend to encourage murder by 
rewarding it.         
125 See infra note 161. 
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many occasions these matters can be addressed by definitional modifications), other gaps 
in legal rule systems can also require effective additions to text.  As noted above with 
respect to both ERISA and Title VII, statutes sometimes emerge lacking entire subsidiary 
rule systems.  In addition, given the presumptive semantic content of statutory rules, 
observant, skillful, and creative lawyers often find applications for rules that were almost 
certainly not anticipated and contemplated by the parties formulating the rules.126 Or, 
they may discover ways to achieve results through the sequential application of rules that 
the party formulating the rules never contemplated.127 Since these uses were not 
anticipated, there are no rules prohibiting them.  Nonetheless, those uses may run counter 
to the statute’s purposes or overriding purposes—purposes that should prevail because 
the applications in question were not contemplated, foreseen, or intended but result from 
the mere happenstance or accident that the rules can literally be so used.   
 The fact is that, except in the rarest circumstances, if any, it is not humanly 
possible in devising a legal rule system to be aware of or anticipate every possible 
simultaneous occurrence of facts and provide a rule for every eventuality.  There are 
potentially an infinite number of real world situations, many only exceptionally rarely 
occurring, that are not dealt with by any statutory rule system as it first emerges from the 
legislative processes.  Were all potential situations addressed, many laws would be 
 
126 Examples include directors’ control over corporate distributions to squeeze out minority shareholders at 
a loss;  the use of mergers to effect amendments to the articles of incorporation that are otherwise blocked 
by the existing articles of  incorporation, or to expel a minority interest; using a dividend to avoid a charge 
to the income statement (Kamin v. American Express, 86 Misc.2d 809, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1976)); the use 
in the late 19th Century of trusts as vehicles for business combinations not possible under then existing 
corporate law absent special legislative grace, which was not always forthcoming or too costly in bribes; 
trust certificates as substitutes for stock certificates; LLC’s,  the formation of which is not limited to “for 
profit” activities, as asset protection devices; and LBOs as vehicles for preferential distributions to owners 
in relation to unsecured creditors.  Tax law and corporate law practices, in particular, involve many 
creative—never before tried/never before ruled on—applications of rules.   
127 See supra note 115.  
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infinitely long sets of rules, with an unlimited number of special situation additions and 
exceptions.  Accordingly, the initial formulation of a statute, even if the purposes are in 
theory fully clarified in the minds of the parties formulating them, can never be more than 
a partial statement of the rule system for achieving the purposes of the statute and all 
simultaneously existing purposes that impinge on the statute.  The partial statement may 
be quite good, addressing most of the situations that actually occur in the world, but it 
will require judicial completion both consistent with the purposes and directed at 
fulfilling and furthering those purposes as rarely occurring situations arise.128 
To recapitulate and complete the observations above in this Part III, statutory 
purposes emerge incomplete, or unrefined, in several, if not all, of the following four 
ways: 
1.  Although the purposes of the statute may be well understood by the parties bringing it 
into existence, those purposes may not be stated or clearly or fully articulated in text.  
2.  In some instances, the purposes of the statute are, in part, highly inchoate because 
those who bring it into existence have not fully formulated and do not themselves fully 
understand them. 
3.  In virtually every instance, the scopes of the statute’s purposes are not fully specified.   
4.  Because of 1-3, the statements or working formulations of the statute’s purposes 
require lexical refinements.  
In addition, every statutory rule system emerges incomplete in most or all of the 
following twelve types of ways:  
 
128 A statute can be quite complete in the sense that it covers the great majority of real world occurrences 
but, nonetheless, fail to address an unlimited number of less frequently or rarely occurring matters. 
49
1.  The rule system has gaps resulting in the need for additional positive, substantive 
rules, additions that given the statute’s purposes ideally would have been included but 
were not due, or on the evidence more likely than not due, only to oversight or failure to 
anticipate the need, 
2.  The rule system has gaps resulting in the need for remedial additions to the rule 
system, additions that for the same reasons should and would have been included,  
3.  The rule system requires exceptions to substantive rules that, given the statute’s 
purposes and the factors that virtually universally limit the scope of legal rules, should 
have been provided and most likely, on the evidence, would have been, but were not due 
to oversight or the failure to anticipate the need,  
4.  The rule system requires exceptions to remedial rules that, for the same reasons, 
should and would have been included,   
5.  The rule system requires exceptions to exceptions that, for the same reasons, should 
and would have been provided, and  
6.  The rule system may be missing one or more subsidiary rule schemes necessary for 
implementation of primary rule schemes.  
In addition, as noted above there may be unaddressed (i.e., nothing in the text of 
the statute resolves the questions that ensue as a result of):  
7.  internal conflicts within  a statute,  
8. conflicts or apparent conflicts between the statute at issue and the Constitution, other 
statutes in United States Code, or state law, with the latter possibly being pre-empted 
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under the Supremacy Clause, and conflicts with other purposes operating in the law that 
may not appear in any statute,129 
9.  non-contemplated uses of a single statutory rule that produce seemingly unwanted 
results,130 
10. non-contemplated simultaneous uses of multiple statutory rules that produce 
seemingly untoward results,  
11. non-contemplated sequential applications of two or more rules that produce 
seemingly untoward results, and  
12.  failures to make it clear whether the statute entitles parties to private causes of action.   
To reiterate, primarily for the benefit of parties of textualist leanings, on the vast 
majority of occasions, the statutory failings above are not only unintended but unwanted.  
They are not consciously intended limitations.  They are not the result of political 
consensus and conscious exclusions from the law but are almost always attributable to 
oversight and the inability to anticipate potentially infinite variations in fact situations.  
As is explained below, when that is so, lack of statutory text does not per se evidence an 
intention that such matters remain un-provided for.  While the legislature may, almost 
certainly does, mean exactly what it says with respect to matters well within its conscious 
 
129 The author believes that the avoidance of irrational, unfair, and unjust results in situations the legislature 
did not contemplate, especially when the purposes of a statute are not served or sufficiently served through 
its application in these situations, is an aim or purpose of the legislature, indeed, of society, even though 
there is no statute to that effect.  We do not have statutes embodying every value that the legislature and 
society expect to operate in the law. 
130 One of the more amusing of such uses may be apocryphal.  The story is that during World War II a 
woman residing in a Southern state wanted to divorce her husband who was in Europe serving in the 
United States Army.  Her attorney found a Civil War statute that had not been repealed which provided that 
any woman resident in the state could secure a divorce if it were proved that her husband was serving in the 
army of the United States of America. Divorce was granted on the basis of the statute, and the legislature 
hastily met to repeal it.  Clearly such a statute was intended to be effective only at such time as there was a 
“war between the states.”  Not apocryphal at all is the use of a merger to affect an amendment of the 
articles of incorporation that is blocked by the articles of incorporation of the corporation that will 
disappear. 
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contemplation, we cannot entertain a presumption to that effect with respect to matters 
overlooked or not anticipated.131 And there are thousands of such matters that ultimately 
surface in the wake of any statute that addresses even a moderately complex subject 
matter.  The legislature, and society for that matter, must be viewed as intending that 
courts, the only parties in position to do so rationally, address these matters and address 
them in quite specific ways.  Constitutionally, of course, if the evidence supports the 
proposition that, for example, what appear to be substantive and remedial gaps and 
omissions were intended, or more likely than not intended, by the law makers, then there 
is, of course, a binding political decision that should be honored if it is constitutionally 
acceptable.  But, in such instances, statutory purposes, ends sought, have for various 
reasons been limited through the political process rather than mere happenstance. 
 Part IV.  The Inherent Deficiencies in the Common, Ordinary, or Usual Meanings of Key  
Statutory Words and Phrases.
Due to recent advances in lexical semantics,132 we are now in position to 
understand the numerous problems that we encounter in the law with respect to words 
and phrases.  Although an ambiguous ambiguity is almost universally cited as the sole 
cause of interpretive problems with respect to statutes, it should be obvious from the 
discussion above that neither lexical nor syntactical ambiguity is the cause of any of the 
 
131 Obviously, the following much cited statement needs to be modified:  “Congress ‘says in a statute what 
it means and means in a statute what it says there.’”  Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters 
Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)).  When a 
party selects a particular dish from a specific, limited restaurant menu, one cannot conclude, on that basis 
alone, that the party would not have preferred a different dish that did not appear on the menu.  Knowledge, 
external to the text of the menu, of the party’s gustatory preferences might well permit one to assert with 
confidence that had Beef Wellington appeared on the menu, the party would doubtless have chosen it over 
all alternatives.  Likewise, when a matter is not dealt with in a statute because it was overlooked or not 
anticipated, that does not mean that it would not have been dealt with had it been recognized.  Further, the 
fact that it was not dealt with under such circumstances does not mean that one cannot say how it would 
have been dealt with, or likely been dealt with, had it been recognized.      
132 See, e.g., Aitchison, supra note 21; Wierzbicka, supra 23; George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous 
Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind (1987).   
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sixteen types of problems identified in Part III.  And, although each of the sixteen types 
of problems identified in Part III can give rise to ambiguity viewed as a conflict between, 
on the one hand, the purposes of statutory rule systems and other purposes 
simultaneously operative in the law and, on the other hand, the results of the application 
of the presumptive semantic content of statutory rules, i.e., an ambiguity of purpose, such 
conflicts are the result, not the cause of the problems we encounter.  Of equal importance, 
ambiguity is not even the primary lexical source of interpretive problems.   
The meanings of words and phrases with which we are most often concerned in 
the law may be viewed in terms of both their extensions and intensions.  The extension of 
a word or phrase that denotes a category we associate with either a noun or a verb 
consists of all instances of the denotata of the word or phrase.  Thus, the extension of 
“cup” is all cups.  The extension of “touch,” as a verb, is all states and acts of touching.  
A word can be defined ostensively through examples of its extension.  That is, one way to 
define “cup” is “objects like this one here and that one over there,” where the words 
spoken are tied to specific objects in the environment, each being a cup, by the gesture of 
pointing.  One way to define “touch” is “states or acts like this one here and that one 
there,” where the words spoken are tied to specific states or acts in the environment, each 
being a state or act of touching, by the gesture of pointing. 
The intension of a word is a theoretically sound definition that is adequate to 
describe the category, or extension, the word is used to denote.  As Anna Wierzbicka, one 
of the world’s leading experts in lexical semantics, and others make clear, dictionary 
definitions are seldom intensions because dictionary definitions seldom are theoretically 
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adequate.133 For example, the primary definition of “cup” in the Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (1986), i.e., that relating to 
a type of drinking vessel,134 is approximately thirty five words.  In contrast, Anna 
Wierzbicka’s definition for “cup” requires two pages of text and addresses, at two levels, 
purpose, material, appearance, size, and use.135 A definition for “touch” is not quite so 
lengthy.  The non-metaphorical intension for “touch,” as a non-active verb (as in “X is 
touching Y”), is something like: “ to be in a spatial relation with another physical object 
whereby the subject is contiguous to and in direct contact with the other physical object.”  
The non-metaphorical intension for “touch,” as a transitive verb (as in “X is in the 
process of touching Y”), is something like: “an act whereby one physical object is 
brought into direct contact with another.”  Statutes involve encounters with at least 
twelve problems with the extensions and intensions—or meanings—of words and 
phrases.  They also regularly involve a thirteenth set of problems with the quantifiers, 
whether express or implied, “all” and “none.”      
Words and phrases used in a statute are often drawn from every day speech, other 
non-legal settings (including technical settings), or other legal settings in which linguistic 
categories have been established in light of purposes significantly different from those 
giving rise to the statute in which they appear.  Since the scientific discipline of lexical 
semantics does not recognize the concept of “plain meanings,” we shall continue to call 
these meanings “common meanings.” Not surprisingly, the common meanings of key 
words and phrases used in a statute, being drawn from non-legal or significantly different 
legal settings, generally do not encompass categories of behaviors/actions, mental states, 
 
133 See supra notes 21 and 24. 
134 There are also cups on golf courses into which golfers attempt to place golf balls. 
135 Lexicography and Conceptual Analysis 26-27 (1985). 
54
events, circumstances, situations, and the like, and combinations of the like, that are 
perfectly suited to the purposes of the statute into which they are introduced.136 Time 
and again we discover, after the fact, that the classifications we need to fulfill the 
purposes of a given statute are generally not perfectly identical to the categories that 
 
136 There is a tendency to believe that we have lexically and conceptually divided and categorized the 
phenomena of the world in all possible ways.  That is erroneous.  The linguistic categories associated with 
words and phrases of the English language do not even begin to divide and classify the phenomena of the 
world into all possible categories.  That would require an infinite vocabulary, a matter far beyond the 
capacity of a finite mind.  Rather, as Derek Bickerton notes: “[W]e [lexically] distinguish only what we (as 
a species or as a cultural group sharing common values) need to interact with in significant ways.”  
Language and Species 35 (1990).  For example: “It has often been noted that no language has words with 
meanings like ‘a left leg and left arm’ or ‘every other Friday’.”  Id. at 44.  Of course, if there were a sport 
that regularly caused simultaneous injuries to the left arm and left leg, we might develop a special term.   
As Alvin Goldman observes:  
The creation of categories, kinds, or ‘versions’ is an activity of the mind or language.  
The world itself does not come precategorized, presorted, or presliced.  Rather, it is the 
mind’s ‘noetic’ activity, or the establishment of linguistic convention, that produces 
categories and categorical systems. 
Goldman suggests viewing the relation  between language and the world in terms not of a correspondence 
between words and pre-existing, external “facts,” but in terms of “fittingness: the  sense in which clothes fit 
a body.” 
The chief advantage of this metaphor is its possession of an ingredient analogous to the 
categorizing and statement-creating activity of the cognizer-speaker.  At the same time it 
captures the basic realist intuition that what makes a proposition, or statement, true is the 
way the world is. 
There are indefinitely many sorts of apparel that might be designed for the human body, 
just as there are indefinitely many categories, principles of classification, and 
propositional forms that might be used to describe the world.  Although the body has 
parts, it is not presorted into units that must each be covered by a distinct garment.  It is 
up to human custom and sartorial inventiveness to decide not only what parts to cover, 
but what types of garments should cover which expanses of body, and whether the 
garments should be snug or loose. . . . 
Despite all this variety—humanly invented variety—there is still the question, for any 
specified type of apparel, whether a specific token of that type fits a particular customer’s 
body.  This question of fittingness is not just a question of style of garment.  It depends 
specifically on that customer’s body.  Similarly, although the forms of mental and 
linguistic representation are human products, not products of the world per se, whether 
any given sentence, thought sign, or proposition is true depends on something extra-
human, namely, the actual world itself. 
Goldman, supra note 11, at 152-53.   
The fact is that we create the categories we find useful, when, as, and to the extent the need arises 
and is recognized.  We find different categories useful at different times and for different purposes and 
create new categories, often by appropriating and adapting existing categories by metaphor, as new needs 
arise.  See Lakoff, supra note 132, George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (1980).  That 
is, we linguistically and conceptually categorize and re-categorize the phenomena of the world as we find it 
useful to do so.  There may be an infinite number of ways external reality could be divided and categorized, 
but we find only a finite number of such ways useful or interesting and most, therefore, are ignored.  When 
we seek categories to suit our legal purposes, our legal purposes may not entail categories that have 
perfectly “fitted” other needs. 
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satisfy everyday or non-legal needs or the needs of other statutes.  The common 
meanings of the words and phrases that represent these categories have been established 
by societal usage conventions or legal concerns in some respects removed from the 
concerns of the statute in question.  There is, accordingly, no reason to expect the 
categories, or extensions,  these words and phrases have historically denoted in non-legal 
contexts or even in other statutes, and, therefore, their meanings, to be perfectly suited to 
the purposes of a given statute.  That is quite common in science.  The category denoted 
by the every day folk biological term “animal” does not suffice for scientific biology.  
The concept of “force” in every day discourse does not suffice for physics.137 Similar 
problems are encountered in the law. 
 The difficulty is that the ways in which the historical meanings of words and 
phrases are partially inappropriate to a statute’s purposes, like the incompleteness of legal 
rules and rule systems, are generally not self-identifying or not fully self-identifying.  It is 
generally impossible, ex ante, to recognize or ascertain the full, potential congruence or 
lack of congruence between the historical lexical categories and the lexical categories 
appropriate to a given statute in light of its purposes, although it is easy to do so ex post 
as the overlooked and unanticipated present themselves.138 The following are twelve 
types of ways in which the meanings of nouns and verbs, and noun and verb phrases, 
from settings other than the statute at issue can be inadequate in light of the purposes of a 
given law.    
1.  To begin with the all too obvious, words and phrases used in statutes can be 
conceptually ambiguous.  The primary form of ambiguity arises when a word denotes 
 
137 When was the last time that it really hit you that force equals mass times acceleration? 
138 Item 6, infra p. 61, and Item 8, infra p. 64, fully illustrate this point.     
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two or more relatively distinct extensions that are at least in part conceptually distinct.  
Although this form of ambiguity is often treated as the essential source of the need for 
statutory interpretation, it is, in fact the least of the lexical problems in the law because 
context resolves most ambiguities so effectively that they are never even noticed.139 As 
noted, the term is all too often used when any problem relating to statutes arises.   
2.  Words and phrases used in statutes can evidence non-conceptual ambiguity due to 
prototypes, or prototypical extensions, and non-typical category members, or non-typical 
extensions.140 Prototypes result when a category has one extension comprised of typical 
members that are generally the subject of reference in a linguistic community but also 
conceptually includes an extension of non-typical members that are not generally the 
subject of reference.141 That is, there is a prototypical extension and a non-typical 
extension, even though both extensions are covered by the same general concept.  The 
existence of prototypes gives rise to a form of ambiguity that is more subtle than 
conceptual ambiguity.  For example, in America, the typical bird is a robin or sparrow.  
Thus, if someone says that he has a number of birds on his lawn, one will assume that the 
party has typical birds on his lawn, not a flock of ostriches or condors, even though, 
conceptually, ostriches and condors are unquestionably birds.  The typical is viewed as 
 
139 For example, if one says of a known alcoholic, “He’s drinking again,” even though there are many 
things a person can drink and the elided direct object is, accordingly ambiguous, almost no one will ever 
notice the ambiguity.  Rather, hearers will automatically understand “alcoholic beverages,” and the 
ambiguity will pass unnoticed.  The example derives from Levinson, supra note 30, at 176.  In a torts class, 
the statement “The defendant was responsible for the battery” would almost certainly be immediately 
understood to mean that defendant was liable for the tort of battery.  It would occur to few that the battery 
in question might be a flashlight battery or an assemblage of artillery.   
140 We can add non-lexical, syntactical ambiguity to the list of problems encountered in the drafting of 
statutes.  For a thorough discussion of the problem see Solan, supra note 16, at 28-92.   
141 On prototypes, see, e.g., Lakoff, supra note 132. 
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intended in use—i.e., is the default—unless further clues are provided.  In the law, issues 
deriving from prototypes occasionally surface.142 
3.  The common meanings of words and phrases used in statutes can be vague in varying 
degrees.  Vagueness is distinct from ambiguity.  Ambiguity exists when there are two (or 
more) distinct meanings (extensions and corresponding intensions) in actual use and it is 
not clear from context which is intended.   Vagueness exists when and to the extent a 
word fails to denote with certainty.143 Vagueness occurs when and to the extent a word’s 
extension is unsettled because there is no established usage convention in a linguistic 
community over a portion of its potential range of use.144 To the extent there is no 
 
142 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) addressed the meaning of the phrase “use a firearm” in 18 
U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1)(West 2000), which enhances the prison term for drug crimes when a party uses a 
firearm in connection with a drug crime.  The phrase has both prototypical and non-typical meanings.  In 
Smith a party, the purchaser of drugs, used an automatic weapon as payment for drugs, and the government 
sought to enhance the penalty on the grounds that the party “used a firearm” in connection with the crime.  
The majority of the justices on the Supreme Court agreed that the defendant had used a firearm within the 
meaning of the statute.  Justice Scalia dissented on the grounds that the phrase typically is used to mean 
such things as to threaten or to inflict injury with a gun.  Justice Scalia was certainly correct in one sense.  
Although on abstract conceptual grounds, the phrase can include use of a firearm as a hammer, door-stop, 
medium of exchange, or fishing line sinker, those are not the prototypical uses.  Of course, the mere fact 
that the court majority opted for a non-typical meaning is hardly proof of error.  See also In re Pizzi, 153 
B.R. 357 (Bankr. Fla. 1993) (holding that what is conceptually clearly an annuity, although not a typical 
annuity, is not an annuity); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1978) (holding, on the basis of 
several patently flawed economic and financial arguments, that what is clearly conceptually an investment 
contract under S.E.C. v. W. J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946), albeit not a typical investment contract, is not 
an investment contract).  
143 Creating a phrase often fails to eliminate vagueness.  The phrase “major life activity” used in the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12117 (2005) (relating to employment), is not 
rendered precise by inclusion of the word “major.”  That word, itself, is vague.  It is what Anna Wierzbicka 
calls an “approximative.”  Anna Wierzbicka, Precision in Vagueness: The Semantics of English 
Approximatives, 10 J. of Pragmatics 597 (1986).  As for “major life activities,” we have no exhaustive list 
of major life activities that is conventionalized in the lexicon.  
144 That is, the word’s or phrase’s extension, or the category members it denotes, is not denoted precisely 
and does not constitute a conventionally established, exhaustive, and discrete set, i.e., the set is potentially 
open—although some members of the set are unequivocally designated by convention.  In terms Paul Ziff 
employs, there is no established regularity of usage with respect to some possible members of the 
extension.  Ziff, supra note 22.  For example, Ray Jackendoff examines the meaning of the verb “defrost” 
and finds that that there are instances of behavior that are clearly instances of defrosting, instances in which 
one is unsure, and other instances where one is clear that the behavior cannot be called defrosting.  Patterns 
in the Mind 198-99 (1994).  He observes: 
The point is that everyone agrees on their judgment of the ideal situation.  As we move 
away from the ideal, there is a broad gray area or penumbra of cases that “sort of” fall 
under the concept, and about which people may disagree somewhat.  Then, as we move 
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established convention of inclusion in or exclusion from a word’s or phrase’s extension, 
one obviously cannot establish by convention what the word denotes and, therefore, 
cannot say what it means, i.e., stands for or represents.145 
Almost all words that denote become vague at the peripheries of their usage.  
Some are vague at their cores.  As a practical matter, vagueness results from the fact that 
in many practical and communicative settings we do not need extremely fine 
denotational, or extensional, precision and, being economical of our time and efforts, we, 
accordingly, do not bother to establish denotational, or extensional, conventions with 
precision beyond our needs.146 In the non-legal settings in which the meanings of words 
 
still further away form the ideal, everyone is in agreement again that the situation does 
not fall under the concept.  
Id. at 199.  Professor Jackendoff then points out that “[i]n the case of the concept of defrosting, the 
existence of a gray area is harmless enough.  Why bother worrying about it?”  Id.  That provides the 
explanation for the gray areas.  There are no needs for societal conventions in the gray areas, at the 
peripheries of the uses of words, because the need for a convention at the peripheries arises too rarely either 
to require or to occasion a societal convention.  Were there needs for societal conventions at the 
peripheries, i.e., greater specificity or precision, they would exist.  Nonce determinations, whether arbitrary 
or not, can generally be made to take care of the rare occasions when a convention is required.   
For example, there is no word or phrase in common usage that captures with precision what the 
phrase “major life activity” in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §12102(2) (West 1995), 
purports to denote.  Being precise in that specific way is not a matter of societal concern outside the law.  
As a result, merely slapping together the words “major,” “life,” and “activity” does not create the precise 
category needed in the law because the concept constituted by the phrase “major life activity” is not 
conventionalized in the American-English lexicon.  In particular, the term “major” is an approximative.  
See Wierzbicka, supra note 143.  The meaning of an approximative, qua definition, may, as Anna 
Wierzbicka has demonstrated, be precise enough (see id.), but the application of the term, as is true of all 
vague terms, cannot be precise in all instances.  This, of course, means that fact finders asked to apply such 
words are being asked to “find” conventions when none exist; that is to establish a convention where none 
existed and to make law. Further, different fact finders can make contradictory law on identical facts.  In 
the case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, not only is there no word or phrase in the American-
English lexicon that provides the precise conceptual distinctions for the category the statute needs, the 
parties drafting the statute were obviously not themselves clear regarding which “life activities” were to be 
considered as within the scope of the statute’s concern, much less all that were to be considered “major.”  
Since they did not know in all instances what they intended, they chose a phrase that is clearly vague at the 
margins. 
145 With words that have prototypical and non-typical meanings, one encounters both ambiguity and 
vagueness.  At some point even the conventions regarding the non-typical run out.  Is a cliff dwelling that 
was used by primitive people, and now occasionally by campers, a dwelling for purposes of burglary?  
There is simply no preexisting convention that says one way or the other. 
146 When the available, historical conventions do not provide the needed precision, we create the precision 
through special definitions.  That is the reason that we create technical definitions for special fields of 
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and phrases evolve and are established through usage conventions, the lack of 
thoroughness or precision in conventional usage poses no problems for linguistic 
communicators.  The words, though vague, suit our needs.  When, however, by statute we 
create entitlements, rights, and obligations that turn on the classifications in question, 
there finally emerges for the first time in human history a need and a reason for persons 
to seek thoroughness and precision.  Someone stands to win or lose a damages award, tax 
deduction, or contingent fee.  Unfortunately, in many instances there is no pre-existing 
convention, no thoroughness, and no precision, and no amount of judicial linguistic 
analysis or resort to canons of construction will uncover any.147 
4.  The common meanings of words and phrases used in statutes can exhibit vagueness in 
the form of binary contrasts.  When the concepts associated with two words putatively 
split phenomena into two mutually exclusive groups but, due to vagueness, i.e., the lack 
of a convention that covers all possible combinations of “facts,” fail to do so, one is often 
faced with phenomena, often behaviors and relations between persons and institutions, 
that do not clearly fall under either concept.  Thus, we encounter such traditionally 
contrasting poles such as: “hot” and “cold,” “large” and “small,” and “tall” and 
“short.”148 In the law we encounter poles such as “dwelling” and “non-dwelling,” 
“material and “immaterial,” “substantial” and “insubstantial,” “employee” and 
“independent contractor,” and “debt” and “equity.”  The extremes of the polar contrasts 
 
study.  Previously, the precise definition that constitutes a technical definition was not needed.  When the 
need is encountered and prior definitions are recognized as inadequate, the technical definition is created. 
147 Anyone who has had to classify jobs as “management,” “administrative,” and the like under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act Regulations (29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1, 541.2, 541.102—541.115, 541.200—541.210 
(2005)) has encountered vast gray areas.  There are no conventions that dictate precisely for each business, 
regardless of its size, where jobs begin and cease to be management or administrative jobs.  What may be 
viewed as a management function in a small business may be viewed as ministerial in a large business.       
148 The meanings of these words are also highly context sensitive.  “Large” in “large elephant” obviously 
signifies something different than “large” in “large microbe.” 
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are clearly enough established by convention, but the middle ground between them has 
not by convention been classed under either pole.  There has been no reason to because 
nothing particularly useful or important to anyone has ever turned on precisely 
classifying the middle between the extremes.  But all that changes when the law enters 
the picture.  The law requires precise, exhaustive classification, but there is none.149 
5.  The common meanings of words and phrases used in statutes can evidence a form of 
vagueness that gives rise to the difference between rules and standards.  A rule is a 
specific and focused convention.  A standard is an unavoidably vague and diffuse 
convention that purports to be complete and exhaustive but, in fact, has substantial gaps 
not covered by convention.  The extensions of the key words and phrases in a rule are 
very specific.  In the case of rules, we make sure there is little vagueness.  For example, 
most states mandate that when a school bus driver approaches rail road tracks, the driver 
is to stop the bus before reaching the tracks, open the door, look both ways, ensure that 
no train is approaching, and close the doors before proceeding.  Thus, the actions that 
constitute “due care” in that setting are precisely specified, i.e., defined.  We do not want 
to leave the matter to individual judgment.  Accordingly, the rule itself precisely 
prescribes the conduct that satisfies it.   
Standards arise from a need to distinguish between permissible and non-
permissible behaviors in a vast number of arenas of action or activity regarding which 
there are in many instances no precise conventions as to what is proper or not, and, 
equally important, cannot be because of the vastness of the number of potential fact 
 
149 What investor, qua investor, cares whether an instrument that has both debt and equity characteristics, 
such as “bond” that pays both fixed interest and additional interest measured as a percentage of profits, or 
preferred stock with a mandatory fixed rate of return, is “really” debt or equity—it simply what it is—
unless, for example an income deduction turns on it. 
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situations.  That is, no one has the time or ability ex ante to identify each situation in 
which the concerns underlying the standard might prevail and to prescribe a rule of 
conduct specifically for each such situation.  We resort to standards, and rationally so, in 
an attempt to accomplish what otherwise could not be accomplished.  Thus, in torts we 
use a standard of due care, even though we have no precise societal conventions that 
categorize all potentially harmful behaviors in all conceivable circumstannces as the 
exercise vel non of due care.  Malpractice, in contrast, establishes precise rules based on 
professional conventions where standards would otherwise prevail.150 
6.  The common meanings of words and phrases used in statutes can conceptually 
misclassify.  In doing so, they can include or exclude facts that ex post should clearly or 
clearly not be within their extensions in light of the purposes of a given statute.  The 
problem of conceptual misclassification can be illustrated by the term “public offering” in 
the transaction exemption (itself, literally, a securities exemption) of subsection 2 of § 4 
of the Securities Act of 1933.151 The traditional meaning of “public offering” was 
conceptually inappropriate, i.e., misclassified, in that it would have in some instances 
denied the act’s protection to parties clearly in need of same.  The Supreme Court 
provided a conceptually distinct and appropriate definition that correctly classified by 
 
150 Although in one sense all vagueness is vagueness, that is the absence of a convention regarding the 
extension of a word or phrase that clearly places certain phenomena within or without the extension of the 
term at issue, vagueness creates several distinct types of logical and practical problems.  For example, the 
vagueness in 3, above, prevents parties from saying unequivocally that a given phenomena is either A or 
not-A.  The vagueness in 4, above, prevents parties from saying unequivocally that a given phenomenon is 
an A or a B.  For the problems those types of vagueness entail for philosophy, especially logic, see Timothy 
Williamson, Vagueness (1996).   The type of vagueness in 5, above, in effect requires juries to make law, 
that is to decide when a party has or has not breached a duty when, but only when, there is absolutely no 
pre-existing societal convention (remember, reasonable persons can disagree!) regarding the propriety of 
the conduct at issue.  That is, we ask juries to establish particular, case specific, after the fact, conventions 
when, but only when, there is no pre-existing convention to guide the conduct of the party charged with 
wrong doing!  Does that really comport with due process or principles of fundamental fairness?   
151 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a—77aa, 77(d)(2) (West 2002). 
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looking specifically to the need for the statute’s protections.152 The definition was also 
new to the lexicon.  Indeed, the definition could not have  been in the lexicon at any time 
prior to the date the President signed the Securities Act of 1933 into law. 
7.  The common meanings, viewed primarily as extensions and secondarily as intensions, 
of words and phrases used in statutes can be over-inclusive in light of a statute’s purposes 
 
152 Subsection 2 of § 4 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(d) (West 1997), exempts from the 
registration requirements of the act “transactions by an issuer not involving a public offering.”  The term 
“public offering” was not a technical, legal term, but rather one deriving from the securities industry.  The 
securities industry uses the term “public offering” to designate and mean something like “securities 
offerings made broadly through the underwriting process, with the capital of all comers sought and 
welcome.”  A non-public, or private, offering could, accordingly, be defined as “any offering of securities 
that the offering group limits to a few individuals or institutions that they approve or a class of individuals 
or institutions that they approve.”  The securities industry’s classification of “public offering” was not, 
however, fully appropriate to the purposes of the Securities Act of 1933.  For the purposes of the act an 
offering not involving a public offering, that is, a non-public offering, is not one wherein the offerors 
restrict the offering to a small group, but rather one in which the offering group makes its offer to those 
individuals and institutions that do not need the protections of the mandatory disclosure requirements of the 
act because they have access to the information that such requirements mandate be disclosed.  There was 
no reason for the securities industry to classify in the same manner that the law classifies.  The purposes 
were different.  In particular, the securities industry was not concerned with protecting persons who needed 
the protections of the act.  If anything, the industry for years aimed at the efficient fleecing such persons.  
That was one of the very reasons for the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933.  Consider, for example, 
the market manipulations of Jay Gould and Commodore Vanderbilt.   Therefore, there was no reason why 
the category the securities industry designated by the term “public offering” should be based on the need 
for the protections of the act.  This illustrates the fact that categories relate to purposes in classification, and 
differences in those purposes will lead to different categories.  
The need to redefine the term “public” and its correlate, “non-public,” became obvious once the 
misclassification was revealed by consideration of the statute’s purposes.  Given the purpose of protecting 
individuals who do not have access to the information securities registration will disclose, the public, for 
purposes of the Securities Act of 1933, is comprised of all persons who need the protections of the act, i.e., 
mandatory disclosure of material information regarding the issuer; and, accordingly, a public offering under 
the act is an offering of securities made to members of that class.  As the Supreme Court, in a pragmatically 
(in the linguistic sense) correct, indeed, in a pragmatically mandated, opinion, held in SEC v. Ralston 
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953), a non-public offering, then, is “an offering made to parties who do not 
need the protections of the act,” while a public offering is “an offering made to parties who need the 
protections of the act.”  
 Conceptually, the definitions of “public offering” and “non-public offering” as operative in the 
securities industry and the act were radically different.  The categories that each concept denoted or 
described, however, coincidentally substantially overlapped.  The historical meaning of the term as 
originally appropriated to the act was highly useful in that it covered a very large portion of the individuals 
who would need the protection of the act, but, as Ralston Purina made clear, it did not cover all.  Radical 
conceptual reclassification was necessary to include a small, additional group needing the protections  of 
the act.  The historically established meanings of “public offering” and “non-public offering,” not only 
initially partially misclassified for purposes of the statute, the corrected, statutory meaning constituted a 
classification that was not previously encoded in the lexicon of the American-English language.  Rather 
obviously, it was a classification that, in fact, could not have existed prior to the passage of the Securities 
Act of 1933.  
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and overriding considerations.  Possibly the most famous, or infamous, example is the 
phrase “relates to” used in the preemption clause of ERISA, a clause that has generated 
numerous interpretive decisions and a good many scholarly articles.153 ERISA’s 
preemption provision purports to preempt all state laws that “relate to” an employee 
benefit plan subject to ERISA.  Everything, of course, relates to everything else in some 
way or ways.  Some of the many ways that state laws can relate to employee benefit plans 
is by legally empowering them, subjecting them to legal obligations, and affecting their 
costs.   Taken literally, ERISA’s “relates to” clause would have, inter alia, eliminated 
malpractice claims against plan medical providers by participants in employer sponsored 
medical plans, freed employee plans subject to ERISA from contract obligations as well 
as shielded those who deal with plans from contractual obligations to the plans, and 
shielded service providers to plans, such as lawyers, accountants, and actuaries, from 
malpractice claims by plans.  Applied literally, the preemption provision would have 
rendered plan operation impossible.  Needless to say, courts have not allowed the reach 
of ERISA’s “relates to” clause to reach so far and have narrowed its extension and 
corresponding intension.154 The resulting meaning, both extension and intension, is 
unique to the both the lexicon and the United States Code and still developing.  
 
153 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144 (1999), referred to by practitioners as ERISA § 514, provides inter alia:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this title and 
title IV shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate 
to any employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) and not exempt under section 4(b) 
. . . .. 
154 “Relate to” may be rephrased (not defined as) “stand in some relation to.”  Phenomena can stand in, e.g., 
temporal, causal, affective, magnitudinal, directional, proximity, containment, genetic, familial, functional, 
and conceptual relations to other phenomena.  Justice Souter has observed: “If ‘relate to’ were taken to 
extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never 
run its course, for “[r]eally, universally, relations stop nowhere,” H. James, Roderick Hudson xli (New 
York ed., World’s Classics 1980).”  New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995).  “[I]nfinite relations cannot be the measure of pre-emption.”  
Id. at 656.  As Judge Karen J. Williams has even more pointedly observed: “Taken at its face, the term 
‘relates to’ has no logical boundary . . ..  In one way or another, everything relates to everything else.”  
64
8.  The common meanings, viewed primarily as extensions and secondarily as intensions, 
of words and phrases used in statutes can be too restricted, or under-inclusive.  For 
example, the historical meaning of the word “discriminate” as used in Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),155 the paramount purpose of which was to ensure 
equality of employment opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, religion, or 
 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Pettit, 164 F.3d 857 (4th Cir. 1998).  That is, everything stands in some 
relation to everything else.  If in no other way, everything exists either before, after, or at the same time as 
everything else and relates to everything else by existing either before, after, or simultaneously with 
everything else.  One could not employ a more comprehensive term.  One significant way state laws can 
relate to employee benefit plans is by having an effect on their administration, their costs, and the like.  In 
spite of the breadth of the phrase courts have over the years pared back, as not counting for purposes of 
ERISA’s preemption provision, the number of ways that state laws can relate to plans subject to ERISA 
and be preempted.  Thus, although state malpractice laws clearly affect employer sponsored health plan 
costs, ERISA does not, with respect to health plans, preempt state malpractice laws.  It would hardly seem 
consonant with a law designed to protect employees to allow physicians providing services through 
employer sponsored health plans to commit malpractice at will,  even though the reduction in risk exposure 
to physicians would likely lower plan costs. See, e.g., Moreno v. Health Partners Health Plan, 4 F.Supp.2d 
888 (D. Arizona 1998); Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F.Supp. 113 (D. Md. 1996); Chaghervand v. CareFirst, 909 
F.Supp. 304 (D. Md. 1995); Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F.Supp. 544 (S.D. Ill. 1994); 
Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F.Supp. 983 (E. Pa. 1990).  On the other hand, if a claim relates to 
a plan denial of medical coverage, even if based on a medical judgment, it is deemed related to plan 
administration and is pre-empted.  See, e.g., Thompson v. GenCare Health Systems, 49 F.Supp.2d 1145 
(E.D. Mo. 1999), aff’d 202 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2000); Brock v. Primedica, Inc, 904 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 
1990); Clark v. Humana Kansas City, Inc., 975 F.Supp. 1283 (D. Kan. 1997)).  Contra Cicio v. Does, 2003 
U.S.App. Lexis 2925 (2003). 
In addition, as a practical necessity it was recognized that employee benefit plans must be allowed 
to engage in transactions in pursuit of their business and that such transactions must be subject to, e.g., state 
commercial laws, even though of course such state laws clearly relate to the employee benefit plans that 
engage in commercial transactions.  Smith v. Provident Bank, 170 F.3d 609 (6th Cir. 1999).  Accordingly, 
claims against employer sponsored employee medical plans by third-party providers for negligently 
affirming insurance coverage for parties who in fact are not covered are not pre-empted.  Meadows v. 
Employers Health Ins. 47 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1995).  Likewise, claims by employers or trustees against 
consultants for negligence, malpractice, and common law fraud are not preempted.  Forbus v. Sears 
Roebuck & Co., 30 F.3d 1402 (11 Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1113 (1995); Airports Co., Inc. v. 
Custom Benefits Services of Austin, 28 F.3d 1962 (10th Cir. 1994); Carl Colteryahn Dairy, Inc.v. Western 
Pennsylvania Teamsters and Employers Pension Fund, 785 F.Supp. 536 (W.D. Pa. 1992).   Because courts 
have rightly judged that a provision put into the law at the last minute without much forethought was not 
intended to lead to the preemption of numerous areas of state regulation just because in some remote way 
they relate to employee benefit plans subject to ERISA, they time and time again decide that given ways of 
relating to ERISA governed plans do not fall within the extension of “relate to” for purposes of ERISA’s 
preemption clause.  For extended discussions of ERISA’s preemption clause, see, e.g., Jeffrey A. Brauch, 
ERISA at 25—and Its Most Persistent Problem, 48 Kan. L. Rev. 285 (2000); Howard Shapiro, René E. 
Thorne, Edward F. Harold, ERISA Preemption: To Infinity ad Beyond and Back Again? A Historical 
Review of Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 58 La. L. Rev. 997 (1998); Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting 
Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretive Issues, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1149 (1998); Catherine L. 
Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption?  A Case Study in the Failure of 
Textualism, 33 Harv. J. on Legis. 35 (1996). 
155 42 U.S.C.A. §§2000e—2000e-17 (West 1994). 
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national origin, proved to be too restricted.  “Discriminate” is a term that traditionally 
denoted intentional conduct.  To serve the purposes of Title VII, the meaning had to be 
expanded to include forms of non-intentional conduct.156 
9.  The common meanings of words and phrases used in statutes can denote excessively 
general categories, extensions, given a statute’s purposes.  That is, the common 
conventions underlying the uses of words and phrases may not accommodate distinctions 
required in light of a statute’s purposes.  If the facts in question were not surfaced or 
anticipated at the time a statute was drafted, the fact that the categories associated with a 
statute’s words or phrases fail to accommodate distinctions needed in light of the statute’s 
purposes will have been noticed by no one.  Accordingly, the lack of necessary 
distinctions will not have been addressed at that time.     
To take an example from the criminal law, there are no words in common usage, 
ethics, or theology that reflect the distinctions required in criminal law relating to 
 
156 Title VII contains a substantive rule that prohibits discrimination in employment based on the fact that 
an individual falls into any of its protected categories.  Until the enactment of Title VII, the term 
“discriminate” had always meant “to distinguish and sometimes also to treat differently on the basis of 
some consciously and intentionally applied standard or recognized differences in characteristics.”  One 
discriminates, for example, between the bouquets of a Burgundy and a Cote du Rhone, between true and 
false friends, between the highly talented and less talented in sports tryouts and musical auditions, and 
between the standard harmonic progressions of J. S. Bach and Gustav Mahler.  An examination of the 
contexts of the uses of “discriminate” outside of Title VII indicates that the term had always denoted 
conscious and intentional conduct.  In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the question was 
presented: can an employer be liable under Title VII for discriminating if it unintentionally excludes a 
protected class from employment.  Specifically, can an employer be deemed to discriminate if, without an 
intention to discriminate, i.e., treat differently, it employs a facially neutral hiring criterion that is not 
related to the ability to perform the job in question but that has an adverse impact on the employment 
opportunities of a group protected by the act?  The Supreme Court held, in a pragmatically correct, indeed, 
in a pragmatically mandated opinion, that an employer can, indeed, be liable under such circumstances.  
After the court’s decision in Griggs it could be said that “discriminate” means “(a) to distinguish and 
sometimes also to treat differently on the basis of some consciously applied standard or recognized 
differences in characteristics and (b) under Title VII, in addition to the conduct in (a), unintentionally to 
treat differently by the use of a facially neutral criterion that is unrelated to the performance of the job if 
the result adversely affects the employment opportunities and other employment related rights of a class 
protected by Title VII,” with the material in italics being both an expansion of the historical meaning and a 
new meaning introduced into the American-English lexicon.  Accordingly, the historical meaning, the 
meaning to be found in the American-English lexicon prior the enactment of Title VII, was too restricted, 
or under-inclusive, in light of the statute’s purposes.  That fact was not apparent at the time the statute was 
enacted and did not surface until almost seven years enactment. 
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wrongful killing.  The technical word “homicide” is too broad, as a killing in self-defense 
is a homicide although it is not a wrongful killing.  The phrase “wrongful killing” is also 
too broad as it does not accommodate the multiple distinctions exhibited in first degree 
murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, 
negligent homicide, and the like, distinctions deemed appropriate in light of levels of 
punishment deemed appropriate in light of differences in mental state.  Those categories 
had to be created in light of the needs of the law.157 
10.  The common meanings of words and phrases used in statutes that capture 
paradigmatic facts can fail to encompass what were above called non-conceptual and 
substantial equivalents.158 When that is so, the extensions, and, therefore, the intensions, 
of the words and phrases will be too restricted.  As noted above, the parties who draft 
statutes may identify what they believe to be all the sets of elemental facts that, given the 
statute’s purposes, should bring the statute’s substantive and remedial schemes into play.  
But the reality is that it is often not possible ex ante to ensure that one has identified all 
such facts.  Some such facts may not even exist until devised through the machinations of 
skilled lawyers reflecting in leisure after the frantic rush that led to the enactment of a 
statute.  Because non-conceptual and substantial equivalents are often extremely difficult 
to uncover, the legislature cannot take the time to dream up all the possible non-
conceptual and substantial equivalents, and accordingly they are often overlooked, not 
anticipated, and not lexically provided for in a legal rule’s coverage.159 
157 In the statutory arena, the term “income” proved too general for the tax laws which have found it 
necessary to distinguish ordinary income from capital gains.   
158 See supra at pp. 41-43. 
159 Any time the legislature expressly or by implication purports to establish an exclusive list of conduct 
that is, e.g., prohibited because it leads to an unwanted end, one can be certain that parties who want to 
achieve that end will attempt to concoct non-conceptual or substantial equivalents to the proscribed conduct 
in an attempt to evade the strictures of the law.  Should a statute read: “Thou shalt not beat thy neighbor 
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11.  The common meanings, viewed primarily as extensions and secondarily as 
intensions, of words and phrases used in statutes can fail to exclude exceptional fact 
aggregates.  As noted above, facts that have been identified and captured by words or 
phrases used in a legal rule can occur in conjunction with additional facts that were not 
initially contemplated, and it may not be proper, given the purposes of the rule or 
overriding considerations,160 to include within the rule’s coverage the aggregate of the 
facts identified and the additional facts, i.e., exceptional fact aggregates.  To the extent 
exceptional fact aggregates are not identified ex ante, they will not be expressly excluded 
from a legal rule’s coverage by exclusion from the extensions of the rule’s words and 
phrases.   
12.  The common meanings, viewed primarily as extensions and secondarily as 
intensions, of words and phrases that denote exceptional fact aggregates may not exclude 
extra-exceptional fact aggregates that constitute exceptions to exceptions that reinstate 
the application of a rule.161 
with stick or stone,” one can be assured it would not be long before crow-bars would become popular items 
with the rough crowd.  That is an obvious case, but often functional equivalents are often concocted by 
counsel in leisure during the months and years following the enactment of a statute.   
160 This situation is aptly illustrated with the common law concept of battery, which was pared back in the 
case of conduct that would otherwise constitute battery to take account additional facts that have given rise 
to privileges such as self-defense, law enforcement, and consent. 
 In the statutory arena, the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1—11 (West 1997), textually fails to 
exclude from its strictures numerous exceptional fact aggregates, specifically those known as “reasonable 
restraints of trade.”  Rather, the act literally prohibits all restraints of trade, and the Supreme Court 
originally so interpreted it.  See U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).  It was not long 
before the courts began to recognize that reasonable restraints should be excepted.  See U.S. v. Addyston 
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (1898).    
161 To again lean on the common law, the privilege of self-defense in battery, an exceptional fact aggregate 
of a battery plus justifying circumstances, is subject to the requirement that one exercising the privilege not 
exceed reasonable force.  By analogy, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 
12101—12213 (West 1995), permits an employer to refuse to employ a disabled person who cannot 
perform the essential functions of the job.  However, an employer that asserts that a disabled individual 
cannot perform the essential function of the job can, nonetheless, be held liable if the disabled person could 
perform the job if provided reasonable accommodation.       
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The thirteenth problem with words arises whenever a statute expressly or 
implicitly covers all conduct, occurrences, situations, and the like, or excludes from its 
coverage all conduct, occurrences, situations, and the like.  Whenever there are 
overlooked or unanticipated exceptions, rather obviously the word “all,” or the implicit 
quantifier “all,” means “some.”  Thus, although § 514(a) of ERISA provides that the 
provisions of titles II and IV of ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as 
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan,”162 courts have held on 
many occasions that given state laws that clearly relate to employee benefit plans are not 
preempted by ERISA.163 Courts have determined that full scale preemption would be 
absurd.  Accordingly, the precise and unambiguous terms, “any” and “all,” terms that by 
canon supposedly require no interpretation, as used in §514(a) of ERISA, in fact, mean a 
quite indefinite “some.”  So it is with respect to many statutes.  
Due to the thirteen factors, above, the presumptive lexical meanings of words and 
phrases used in statutes may not be what is fully appropriate or required in light of the 
statute’s purposes and other purposes operating in the law.  The meanings of the words 
and phrases used generally clearly cover the paradigmatic facts a statute is designed to 
address.  Those facts are recognized ex ante. If the common, usual, or standard meanings 
of words and phrases do not capture the paradigmatic facts, that fact will be recognized 
and the words and phrases will be supplied with special definitions sufficient to capture 
them.  But the drafters of statutes cannot generally ex ante recognize these lexical 
inadequacies or cannot recognize all of them, and, therefore, cannot address them or all 
of them ex ante. Therefore, courts are often forced ex post to redefine words—not simply 
 
162 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a)(1999) (emphasis added). 
163 See supra note 154. 
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resolve lexical ambiguities—to bring their meanings into line with the purposes of a 
given statute, often creating meanings that are new to the human lexicon.164 
Conclusion
With the fundamental problems that we face in formulating statutory rule systems 
identified in significant detail, it is clear that the fundamental objective in statutory 
interpretation must be to accomplish ex post what has unintentionally and unavoidably 
been left undone in the formulation process.  That is the only way to avoid unintended, 
random, accidental, arbitrary, and often irrational, unfair, or unjust results when 
overlooked and unanticipated situations surface—results that, even with the utmost 
diligence, often could not ex ante be avoided by express statutory provisions or express 
definitions and that run counter to the purposes of the statute at issue and other purposes 
simultaneously operating in the law.  Avoiding such results requires: (1) ascertaining the 
purposes underlying statutory rule systems and, when, and to the extent that, the purposes 
are inchoate or unrefined, properly clarifying or refining them, (2) using the purposes 
underlying statutory rule systems and other purposes simultaneously in operation in the 
law to complete inevitably incomplete statutory rule systems in consonance with those 
purposes when and as often as any of the twelve types of incompleteness identified in 
Part III surface, and (3) using the purposes in (2) to modify the meanings of words and 
 
164 It may be worthwhile to note that some matters can be addressed by either the addition of rules to a 
statute or by the equivalent modification of the meanings of words and phrases.  These alternatives arise 
whenever it is appropriate either to expand or contract a category of covered, or elemental, facts.  Such 
expansions or contractions can be accomplished either by special rules expressly including or excluding 
appropriate category members or by redefining words and phrases to include or exclude the appropriate 
category members.  Thus, if it is appropriate, in connection with a given labor or employment law, to 
include independent contractors among the protected group along with common law employees, the courts 
can either hold (a) that in addition to common law employees, an expressly protected category, the 
purposes of the law demand that independent contractors also be covered or (b) that for purposes of the 
statute in question the word “employee” includes independent contractors.  The substantive result is the 
same.  Courts appear often to prefer covertly to redefine to avoid the appearance “making” law.   
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phrases used in statutory rule systems to bring those meanings into line with the purposes 
when any of the thirteen types of deficiencies in lexical meaning identified in Part IV 
surface.  Accomplishing those three tasks simultaneously resolves ambiguities. 
 Ideally, we would like a process that enables us to accomplish the three tasks in a 
manner (1) that is fully consonant with the constitutional principle of legislative 
supremacy and that is, therefore, entirely objective and politically and ideologically 
neutral, (2) yields predictable results in all cases, (3) is epistemologically unassailable, 
and (4) operates in accordance with the cognitive processes whereby we comprehend 
language—which processes, not surprisingly, generally operate in accordance with the 
principles of epistemology.  While identifying the problems we encounter in formulating 
statutory rule systems reveals the process for addressing them, we cannot achieve the 
ideal.  Nonetheless, we can, fortunately, approach the ideal.   
Reflection reveals that the problems we encounter with respect to statutes are 
common in human experience, and the process for addressing them is readily identifiable 
and amazingly uniform and constant across a broad array of human activities.  The 
adaptations of this process to accommodate the occasional special needs of the law are 
minor and obvious.  In general terms, formulating statutes requires us to establish 
schemas, plans or designs if you will, for accomplishing given purposes in the face of 
eventualities a number of which have inevitably been overlooked and others of which 
have not been, in many instances, could not be, anticipated.  That is common in human 
experience.  There are thousands of other settings in which we face the identical 
problems, in which we must formulate plans or designs for accomplishing given purposes 
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in the face of overlooked and unanticipated occurrences or events.165 These settings 
range from the primitive activities of hunting, battle, and exploration to more recent 
additions to the human behavioral repertoire such as nautical navigation, mergers and 
acquisitions, recreational mountain climbing, mining operations, vacation traveling, 
architectural design and construction projects, and even the calling of plays in football.  
In all these settings we employ virtually identical criteria in responding to the overlooked 
and unanticipated as they present themselves.  The criteria are in large part those of 
means rationality—criteria for effectively accomplishing purposes in accordance with 
their relative priorities—with occasional reference to ends rationality in connection with 
the scopes of ends.  The result is that there is associated with these settings a virtually 
universal and uniform set of intentions about addressing overlooked and unanticipated 
situations as they are encountered.  Further, because we all address such situations in 
virtually the same ways with virtually identical intentions, it is often obvious how to do 
so and, in any event, generally feasible for us to do so on behalf of others in ways that 
either in fact comport with their purposes or can reasonably be regarded as comporting 
with their purposes.  That is why agents and subordinates can successfully act for their 
principals and implement directives and carry out orders in the face of overlooked and 
unanticipated situations when the principals are not available for further direction.   
 
165 This fact and its implications have been explored in significant depth in Michael E. Bratman, Intentions, 
Plans, and Practical Reasoning (1987).  As Professor Bratman observes: 
We do not [act on the basis of] plans that specify, once and for all, everything we are to 
do in the future.  Such total plans are obviously beyond our limits.  Rather, we typically 
settle on plans that are partial and then fill them in as need be and as time goes by.  This 
characteristic of incompleteness of our plans is of the first importance.  It creates the need 
for a kind of reasoning [practical reasoning] characteristic of planning agents; reasoning 
that takes initial, partial plans as given and aims at filling them in with specifications of 
appropriate means, preliminary steps, or just relatively more specific courses of action. 
Id. at 3 (emphasis in the original).  See also Michael E. Bratman, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on 
Intention and Agency (1999).     
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 It would appear that legislators do not fully appreciate the practical problems they 
face in formulating statutory rule systems or, presumably, they would explain in 
legislative history, the text of the statute being formulated, or in a special statute 
governing the interpretation of statutes generally, the intentions they have regarding the 
manner in which overlooked and unanticipated situations are to be addressed when they 
ultimately surface.  Nonetheless, there are ascertainable intentions with quite specific 
content that can be, rationally must be, attributed to the legislature and that dictate how to 
address such situations.  Since these intentions are implicit in human behavior, although 
not expressly declared by the legislature, they may in the legislative setting be called 
“implicit legislative intentions.”  They enable courts to carry out the tasks that constitute 
the interpretation of statutes in ways that either are or may most reasonably be viewed as 
intended by the legislature.  They enable courts to address overlooked and unanticipated 
situations in consonance with the constitutional provision for legislative supremacy even 
when the results are not ex ante provided for by statutory text.  
The set of implicit legislative intentions is both sophisticated and moderately 
numerous.  It encompasses, for example, the intentions to include within a statute’s 
coverage overlooked and unanticipated non-conceptual and substantial equivalents of 
paradigmatic statutory facts, to add to statutory rule systems missing substantive and 
remedial rules that are necessary or beneficial in giving effect to a statute’s purposes, to 
deny effect to the presumptive semantic content of statutes when giving the presumptive 
semantic content effect would yield results counter to the purposes underlying the statute, 
to deny effect to overlooked and unanticipated successive applications of rules that 
produce results at variance with the underling purposes of the statute or other higher 
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priority purposes the law is simultaneously pursuing, to give effect to higher priority 
purposes when purposes of the law conflict, and to modify the meanings of words and 
phrases to bring their meanings into line with the purposes underlying the statute in 
which they appear and other purposes simultaneously operative in the law.  Each of these 
examples reflects principles of rationality in the completion of purposive plans and 
designs as overlooked and unanticipated matters arise.  They are, therefore, in large part 
objective and politically and ideologically neutral.  They apply to both liberal and 
conservative as well as consensus legislation.  They operate not to slant results politically 
or ideologically but appropriately to complete statutory rule schemes and appropriately to 
modify meanings of words and phrases used in statutory rule schemes in light of the 
purposes underlying a statute and other purposes the law is simultaneously pursuing.    
Not surprisingly, courts regularly and instinctively resort to these implicit 
legislative intentions in the interpretive process.  They account for, and justify, numerous 
judicial decisions, many of which textualists condemn.  They also account for Justice 
Scalia’s observation that on some occasions in interpreting statutes we resort to what 
appear to be “objectified intentions.”166 They are objectified in the sense that they are so 
inter-subjectively universal that we can virtually always count on them prevailing.  It 
takes special evidence to convince us that they are not operative on a given occasion.   
Because jurists have focused on the obvious but superficial problem of resolving 
an ambiguous ambiguity and not on the fundamental problems of clarifying and refining 
statutory purposes, completing statutory rule schemes in light of their underlying 
purposes and other purposes simultaneously operating in the law, and modifying the 
meanings of words and phrases to bring them into line with those purposes as the 
 
166 Scalia, supra note 4, at 17. 
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overlooked and unanticipated present themselves, jurists have, in the traditional theories 
of legislative intent and statutory purpose, overlooked the set of intentions we virtually 
universally employ in dealing with problems of the types we encounter in formulating 
statutes.  Some scholars have correctly pointed out the deficiencies in the traditional 
notions of legislative intent and statutory purpose when we encounter situations that the 
legislature overlooked or failed to anticipate.167 In such situations there are, of course, no 
express legislative intentions.  The set of implicit legislative intentions remedies those 
deficiencies by picking up at exactly the point at which traditional approaches to 
legislative intent and statutory purpose cease to be effective.  By looking beyond 
legislative history and statutory text and taking the set of implicit legislative intentions 
into account, we can construct a far more realistic and complete picture of legislative 
intentions and purposes than jurists have traditionally recognized and employed in 
statutory interpretation.  We can thereby address those situations that the traditional 
views of legislative intent and statutory purpose cannot reach.   
The insights in Parts III and IV of this article alone should come close 
permanently to putting textualism to rest.  When, in the article that is the companion to 
this one, we add to the mix insights from epistemology and the linguistic discipline of 
pragmatics, there is no doubt that textualism can be philosophically, scientifically, and 
linguistically eliminated as an intellectual force in the law.168 Further, the set of implicit 
legislative intentions, together with the linguistic discipline of pragmatics, will also allow 
 
167 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 312 (1990).    
168 Textualism operates on the assumption that language is simply a code.  Note 17, supra, indicates why 
that is wrong.  The discussion above also makes it clear why textualism creates such a drag on remedial 
legislation.  It prevents courts from acting in overlooked and unanticipated situations to rationally complete 
such legislation in accordance with its purposes.   
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us permanently to set aside many of the canons of construction and appropriately to 
revise and justify those that have some continuing validity.  They will also provide a 
much needed answer to the excessive claims of nihilistic skeptics.  As an added bonus, 
when we employ them the results we achieve are epistemologically unassailable.  And, 
somewhat surprisingly, the linguistic discipline of pragmatics makes clear that employing 
them in the interpretive process accords with the cognitive processes whereby we 
comprehend language generally.  
When the implicit legislative intentions are identified in full and applied in 
statutory interpretation, the problems we encounter in interpreting statutes shrink to quite 
manageable proportions, although they do not vanish entirely.  We cannot achieve the 
ideal.  Nonetheless, this set of intentions allows for a much higher percentage of 
determinate, albeit, not always certain, outcomes than does the usable but theoretically 
inadequate and partially conflicting mishmash of traditional legal reasoning.169 We see 
that many decisions in the reporters were inevitable in light of these intentions.  There 
are, however, residual situations, generally at the periphery of statutory rule systems, in 
which even the set of implicit legislative intentions does not mandate entirely objective, 
politically and ideologically neutral, determinate outcomes.  There are situations in which 
the set of implicit legislative intentions can do no more than mandate that judges, parties 
who ideally have no personal stake in the outcome, attempt to provide a rational, fair, and 
just outcome as best they can conceive one.  That, however, is an imperfection that we 
can live with.  Some might rationally conclude that it is not even an imperfection. 
 
169 Outcomes that on the available evidence are favored by the probabilities, for example, that the 
legislature intended them, cannot be rejected and are, therefore, determinate.  Whether the legislature 
actually intended them can, nonetheless, be uncertain.  The same holds in gambling.  Once one knows the 
odds, the proper bet is fixed.  The outcome on a specific occasion may, however, render a proper bet a 
losing bet.  Nonetheless, we rationally act in all settings on the basis of the probabilities.  
